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Well, sir, I'm not a potted plant. I'm here as the lawyer. That's my job.'
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1. Iran-ContraInvestigation:Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Secret
Military Assistance to Iran and the NicaraguanOpposition and the House Select Comm. to
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988) (testi-

mony of Oliver L. North,July 7-10, 1987). Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr., attorney for Lt.
Col. Oliver L. North, responding to the exasperated admonition of Iran-Contra
committee chairman Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat from Hawaii, that Mr.
North could object to the questioning himself if he so desired, but that, under
congressional rules, a lawyer representing a testifying witness has a limited role. Id.
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I

INTRODUCTION

N recent years, the legal profession has become increasingly
concerned with an alleged growing lack of "civility" among

practitioners. 2 This concern, bordering on obsession, has given

birth to a previously unheard of creature, the "Rambo litigator,"3 a
practitioner who interprets "zealous representation" as a call to
arms, views litigation as war and employs any and all tactics in order
to secure victory. 4 In a rush to reign in Rambo, the landscape of
civil litigation has seen many significant changes, most predominantly in the area of discovery. 5 It is in discovery where Rambo has
2. See THE TENTH

ANNUALJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
146 F.R.D. 205, 216-32 (Apr. 30, 1992)
[hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE] (discussing perceived "incivility among law-

OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,

yers" that "has flourished in the 80s"); see also FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CIV1Lrrv OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 143 F.R.D. 441, 445 (1992)

[hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (discussing "civility problems plaguing our profession"); INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMrITEE ON CIVILrrY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 143 F.R.D. 371, 375 (1991) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT] (stating that law has changed from occupation characterized by congenial professional
relationships to one of "abrasive confrontations"). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences
of Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (1994) (arguing recent concerns
with abuse in discovery are not based on any empirical data but instead are myth
created by popular media, politicians, lawyers and judges).
3. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 216 (discussing "incivility among

lawyers" that "has come to be called Rambo-style lawyering").
4. See id. at 217 (discussing tactics commonly utilized in "hardball litigation"
for purposes of obstruction and delay); Robert N. Saylor, Rambo Litigation: Why
HardballTactics Don't Work, 74 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 78, 79-80 (characterizing
mindset and tactics of Rambo Litigator). See generally Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo
Litigators:Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 637 (1990)
(criticizing use of unfair tactics and intimidation by attorneys).
5. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991) (discussing proposal for
mandatory disclosure and rulemaking process, which, in part, included no empiri-
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been accused of seeking to bury opponents in discovery requests
and obstructing opponents from obtaining relevant information
and evidence. 6 These tactics allegedly result not only in a waste of
time and resources but also are seen as subverting the goal of just
7
results being obtained in litigated disputes.
Perhaps most significant, if not most controversial, among the
changes in how discovery is conducted are the mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8
The scheme of discovery countenanced by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, whereby parties seek to obtain relevant information from an opposing party, was transformed, in part, to a system
of initial disclosure of relevant information to a party's opponent.9
This less adversarial approach to discovery seeks to take from
Rambo one of the fields on which to do battle, 10 at least in those
cal study as to need or efficacy for disclosure provision); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin 's New-Old Procedureas a Possible Antidote to
Dreyfuss's "Tolstoy Problem, "46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 67-68 (1994) (discussing "the Spell of
Crisis Rhetoric" and "Corresponding Rush to Reform").

6. See, e.g.,

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 2, at 445. The report noted:

A lack of civility can escalate clients' litigation costs while failing to advance their interests or bring them closer to their ultimate goal of ending
disputes. Time expended in "Rambo"-style discovery can hinder or prevent litigation parties from getting to the heart of the important contested issues. Furthermore, with today's crowded dockets, judicial time is
wasted resolving needless (often petty) disputes, which, in turn, deprives
those litigants who are ready for trial of the opportunity for a more expeditious hearing. Everyone is harmed.
Id.
7. Id.; see also Saylor, supra note 4, at 80-81 (discussing why Rambo tactics are
counter-productive).
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1)-(5) (providing, in part, for disclosure "without
awaiting a discovery request" of witnesses, documents, and tangible things "that are
relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings"); AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507-12 (1993)
(dissenting statement of Scalia, J.) (explaining, in part, his dissent from transmitting to Congress proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure containing mandatory disclosure provisions because of "nearly universal criticism from
every conceivable sector of our judicial system, including judges, practitioners, litigants, academics, public interest groups, and national, state and local bar and professional associations").
9. Id.; see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The What and Why of the New Discovery Rules,
46 FLA. L. REv. 9, 13 (1994) (detailing requirement of amended Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that require mandatory disclosure under discovery rules); Rogelio
A. Lasso, GladiatorsBe Gone: The New Disclosure Rules Compel a Reexamination of the
Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L. REv. 479 (1995) (analyzing mandatory disclosure rules
and assessing their effectiveness at controlling discovery abuses).
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments)
(discussing that in fulfilling initial disclosure obligations "[t] he litigants should not
indulge in gamesmanship"). But see Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein,
Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure,73 TEx. L. Rv. 753 (1995) (arguing
that mandatory disclosure provision will actually increase litigation costs).
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district courts which have not "opt[ed] out" of the disclosure provisions of Rule 26.11 Additionally, limitations on discovery have
sought to lessen the impact of the weapons in Rambo's arsenal by
restricting the number of interrogatories that a party may serve
upon another party, 12 or limiting the number of depositions that a
13
party may take.
The district courts have also sought to employ mechanisms
aimed at curtailing Rambo through local rulemaking. 14 Many of
these echo the above attempts at limiting how much discovery a
party may undertake or the manner in which discovery is undertaken.1 5 Nevertheless, several district courts have recently embarked on a very different approach to curbing perceived discovery
abuse. Rather than curtailing available discovery mechanisms, this
approach redefines how an attorney may interact with his or her
client. These district courts have enacted rules that seek to preempt Rambo from interfering with the discovery process through
improper "witness-coaching" by prohibiting an attorney from engaging in off-the-record consultation with his or her client-witness
16
during the course of a deposition.
Not surprisingly, this control of attorney conduct by local rule
has been decried by many of the practitioners who are subject to
11. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1) (providing for initial disclosure of specified
categories of information without awaiting discovery request).
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a) (limiting number of interrogatories that may be
served upon another party to 25 ).
13. See FED. R. Crv. P. 30(a) (2) (A) (limiting party to 10 depositions that may
be taken without seeking leave of court).
14. The local rulemaking power of the district courts has several sources of
authority, from both rule and statute. See The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994) (requiring under § 471 that each district court enact and
implement expense and delay reduction plans that will "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes"); 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (a) (1994) (providing that "all courts established by Act of Congress
may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules
shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure
.
"); FED.....R. Civ. P. 83 (Advisory Committee Notes, 1985 Amendment) (permitting "each district to adopt local rules not inconsistent with the Federal Rules").
15. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECr: LOCAL RULES

ON CIVIL PRACTICE (July 1988) [hereinafter REPORT OF LoCAL RULES PROJECT]

(containing most comprehensive collection of local rules, though somewhat
dated); id. at 86-117 (setting forth local rules addressing discovery matters that
"generally repeat several Federal Rules").
16. For a discussion of the various formulations taken by adopted or proposed local rules that prohibit attorney-client conferences during deposition, see
infra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
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it. 17

Unlike other efforts to curb discovery abuse, the no-consultation rule is not merely a control on discovery mechanisms. Instead,
it intrudes into the attorney-client relationship and relegates the
role of the attorney to that of a "potted plant" for the sake of curbing the potential for discovery abuse."' Though rules of professional conduct may prescribe attorney obstruction with the flow of
information during discovery, the no-consultation rule is based on a
mistrust of attorney adherence to ethical obligations. The rule,
therefore, seeks to take away the opportunity for an attorney representing a client being deposed to commit an ethical breach, based
on the presumption that attorneys will act unethically if given the
opportunity.
This article will analyze the varying formulations of the no-consultation rule and discuss how this seemingly innocuous rule is remarkable in two main respects. First, the rule represents much of
what critics of local rulemaking have decried. 19 In a rush to address
incivility in deposition practice, the rule has been enacted with little
or no empirical data supporting the need for the rule.2 0 In addition, overlooked in the process are several legitimate purposes for
off-the-record conferences during depositions that aid rather than
subvert the discovery process and may be professionally mandated.
The rule also represents suspect local rulemaking because its most
far-reaching formulations violate a constitutionally protected right
to consult with counsel and redefine the attorney-client privilege.
Because these formulations are inconsistent with existing rules of
17. As will be discussed, a pretrial order entered in Hall v. Clifton Precision,
150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993), has become the standard-bearer of the no-consultation rules. The decision was given much attention in law-related media. Much
of the literature chronicled shock among the bar at the prohibition on client consultation during deposition. See, e.g., Shannon P. Duffy, Judge Bars Conferences at
Depositions;Ruling Sends Shockwaves, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 29, 1993, at 1 (containing collection of unfavorable attorney reactions to ruling in Halo. For a complete discussion of the Hall Rule, see infra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
18. See A REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF DEPOSITIONS, FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL,
COMMITTEE ON SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS, 131 F.R.D. 613, 627 (1990) [hereinafter
SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF DEPOsrrIONS] (criticizing proposed

no-consultation rule as "an improper interference with the attorney/client relationship . . . [and] a gag order that could prevent a client from requesting legal
advice").
19. Local rulemaking pursuant to Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been roundly criticized as a "threat to the integrity of the Civil Rules"
adopted in a "casual manner." CHARLES ALAN WiGrr, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 62, at 431-32 (5th ed. 1994). Local rulemaking pursuant to The Civil Justice
Reform Act has been referred to as "[a] threat far greater than [local rulemaking
pursuant to Rule 83]". Id. § 63A, at 436.
20. For a discussion of this development, see infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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procedure and evidence, they are beyond the local rulemaking
power of the district courts.
Second, the no-consultation rule represents the nadir of attempts to regulate abusive attorney conduct. Instead of drawing a
line between acceptable and impermissible conduct, the approach
of the no-consultation rule is to assume that attorneys will act unethically if given the opportunity. Based on this presumption, the
rule seeks to take away the opportunity for prohibited conduct, but
in doing so, it intrudes upon the basic nature of the attorney-client
relationship. Therefore, the rule represents what could become
the next evolutionary development in regulation of the profession-preempting abusive conduct rather than prohibiting it and
punishing the offenders. Unfortunately, this preemptive approach
intrudes into the attorney-client relationship and is counter-productive to its own goals of efficient and full disclosure of information
during discovery.
Finally, this article will discuss the proposition that where the
district courts feel compelled to pursue this path, the best approach
is the least intrusive one. The goals of the no-consultation rule can
be accomplished simply by prohibiting attorney-client consultations
while a question is pending.2 1 This approach prevents direct coaching of a witness as to a pending question, but allows for the legitimate uses of off-the-record conferences. Therefore, the functions
of an attorney serving a client and aiding the tribunal are not unnecessarily supplanted. Rambo is thereby curtailed but is not transformed into a potted plant.
"11.

A MYRIAD OF POTS

In an effort to control perceived discovery abuse by attorneys
22
representing a person being deposed, district courts have adopted
21. This approach has been taken by a minority of district courts that have
adopted no-consultation rules. For a discussion of this approach, see infra notes
38-39 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO, RULE 30.1C, Sanctions for Abusive
Deposition Conduct [hereinafter DIST. OF COLORADO, RuLE 30.1C]; LOCAL RULES
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA,

GENERAL RULE 30.1, Conduct of Depositions [hereinafter S. DIST. OF INDIANA, RULE
30.1]; RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND
EASTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK, CIVIL RULES, App. B, RULE 13 [hereinafter S./E.
DIST. OF NEW YORK, RULE 13]; RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, CIVIL RULE
204(b), Differentiated Case Management and Discovery [hereinafter M. DIST. OF
NORTH CAROLINA, RULE 204]; LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, CIVIL RULE 230-5, Depositions
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or are considering 3 local rules aimed at curbing the practice of an
attorney and client having off-the-record communication during
the deposition. 24 By prohibiting such communications between attorney and client, the rules aim to remove the opportunity for an
attorney to subvert the discovery process by suggesting answers to
his or her client, commonly known as "witness coaching." 25 While
[hereinafter DIST. or OREGON, RULE 230-5]; LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT OF WYOMING, RULE 30, Depositions Upon Oral Examination
[hereinafter DIST. OF WYOMING, RULE 30]. For the applicable text of these rules,
see Appendix A.
See also Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.RD. 525, 531-32 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(entering order containing guidelines for conduct of depositions in case)
[hereinafter Hall Rule]. For the applicable text of the rule from Hall, see
Appendix A. Hall has been much discussed and cited for the proposition that
conferences between a deponent and his or her attorney are prohibited for any
purpose other than determining whether to assert a privilege. See, e.g., Christy v.
Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 160 F.R.D. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying plaintiff
protective order prohibiting defendants from instructing witnesses at deposition to
not answer questions that violate attorney-client privilege); Chapsky v. Baxter, No.
93-CIV-6524, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9099, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 5, 1994) (stating that
"relevance is rarely an appropriate grounds for instructing a deponent"); Van
Pilsum v. Iowa State Univ. of Science & Technology, 152 F.R.D. 179, 181 (S.D. Iowa
1993) (ordering sanctions against attorney using "Rambo Litigation" tactics);
Johnson v. Wayne Manor Apts., 152 F.R.D. 56, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that
deponent was no longer permitted to speak with counsel except where anticipated
answer to question would involve disclosing material protected by attorney-client
privilege); WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 84, at 614 n.32 (concerning private
conferences between deponent and attorney).
The above are the local rules addressing conferences between attorney and
deponent during deposition that could be found through computerized research
and a non-exhaustive manual search. For a list of the proposed rules, see infra
note 23. I do not purport that the rules set forth herein are all-encompassing. As
noted by Professor Wright, one of the "traps" for practitioners lurking in local
rules is "[t]he difficulty in finding out what local rules are in effect .. " WRIGHT,
supra note 19, § 62, at 431 n.31. Nevertheless, I believe the rules herein provide a
good representational sample of the varying approaches that form a sufficient
basis for discussion. Any further search undoubtedly would have resulted in
research assistant revolt.
23. See, e.g., PROPOSAL TO ADOPT LOCAL RULES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, RULE 5.23, Deponent-Attorney
Communications (May 24, 1995) [hereinafter N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RULE
5.23]; PROPOSED UNIFORM DEPOSITION DISCOVERY RULES FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS
IN THE UNITED STATES SECOND CIRCUIT, RULE 6 [hereinafter SECOND CIRCUIT PROPOSED RULE 6]. For the applicable text of these proposed rules, see Appendix B.
24. For a discussion of the different approaches taken by local rules concern-

ing when the prohibition applies, or, in other words, what constitutes "during the
deposition," see infra notes 36-48.
25. See Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 528. The Hall court gave a mocking, yet accurate
definition of witness-coaching, commenting that "[t] he witness comes to the deposition to testify, not to indulge in a parody of Charlie McCarthy, with lawyers coach-

ing or bending the witness's words to mold a legally convenient record." Id. at 528;
see also N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS PROPOSED RULE 5.23(B), supra note 23 (stating that
purpose of proposed no-consultation rule is to "prevent counsel for a deponent
from improperly suggesting answers or the content of testimony to a witness").
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the essence of the varying rules remains the same, prohibiting communications between a deponent and his or her attorney, a wide
variety of approaches have been taken. The troublesome issues
raised by a prohibition against attorney-client communication during deposition are illustrated by these different approaches.
A.

Who?

Several variations exist as to whom the prohibition applies.
These differences have significant implications as to whether the
prohibition violates a constitutionally protected right to counsel. 26
The most common approach is to prohibit any conference between
attorney and client during the deposition except for conferences to
determine whether a privilege should be asserted. 27 Other districts
back off a blanket prohibition and instead draw distinctions between conferences initiated by an attorney and those initiated by
the client, making only the former impermissible.2 8 Presumably,
this distinction recognizes the attorney as the most likely "bad actor" in deposition consultation and allows client-initiated conferences as a nod toward some right of representation. Nevertheless,
another formulation, derived from Hall v. Clifton Precision29 (Hall
Rule), rejects any distinction between client-initiated and attorneyinitiated conferences, and views any conference as an opportunity
for "obstructing the truth" because it allows the deponent the op26. For a discussion concerning who the prohibition applies to and the effect
this has on the constitutionally protected right to counsel, see infra notes 217-37
and accompanying text.
27. See DIST. OF COLORADO, RuLE 30.1C(A)(2), supra note 22 (prohibiting
"off-the-record conference(s) except for the purpose of determining whether to
assert a privilege"); M. DIST. NORTH CAROLINA, RuLE 204(b) (2) (iii), supra note 22
(same); Dis-r. OF OREGON, RuLE 230-5(d), supra note 22 (requiring pending questions to be answered "before a recess is taken unless the question involves a matter
of privilege"); Hall Rule, supra note 22, at 531-32 (prohibiting off-the-record conferences "except for the purpose of deciding whether to assert a privilege"); see also N.
DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RuLE 5.23(B), supranote 23 (prohibiting communication between counsel and deponent during examination in deposition except for
the purpose of deciding whether to assert privilege).
28. See S. DIST. OF INDIANA, RuLE 30.1(c), supra note 22 (stating that "[a]n
attorney for a deponent shall not initiate a private conference"); S./E. DIST. OF
NEW YoRK, RuLE 13, supra note 22 (same); see also SECOND CIRcurr PROPOSED RuLE
6, supra note 23 (providing that "[a]ttorney initiated conferences ... are not presumptively improper").
It is not always entirely clear as to whether a rule applies to all conferences or
just those that are attorney-initiated. See DIST. OF WYOMING, RuLE 30(e), supranote
22 (providing that "attorney... shall not engage in a private conference with the
deponent"). Prohibiting "engaging" in a conference would seem to apply to any
conference, without regard to who initiated the conference.
29. Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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portunity to "ask his or her lawyer for the answer, and then parrot
30
the lawyer's response."
Yet another variation distinguishes between party deponents
and non-party deponents, applying the prohibition only to nonparty deponents and their counsel.3 1 Because of the nature of the
local rulemaking process, the justification for this distinction is nowhere stated. 32 Nevertheless, it could be assumed that it addresses
the differing rights of party and non-party witnesses to consult with
counsel; the latter having no constitutional right to consultation,
and, therefore, constituting a less controversial object of a no-con33

sultation rule.

One would think that a non-party deponent, with nothing at
stake in the litigation at hand, and his or her attorney would have
little if any incentive to engage in improper behavior during the
consultation. Moreover, the non-party attorney and client would
seem to have had far less occasion to discuss and be familiar with
the matter giving rise to the deposition. Therefore, it could be argued that greater need would exist to discuss matters for innocent
or required purposes. 34 Nevertheless, the right to counsel appar35
ently does not extend to party and non-party deponents alike.

30. See id. at 528.
31. SeeDisT. OF WYOMING, RuLE 30(e), supra note 22 (prohibiting conferences
during deposition only between attorney and "non-party deponent").
32. Amendments were made in 1988 to 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and in 1985 to Rule
83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to interject opportunity for notice and
comment to the local rulemaking process. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(e) (1988); FED. R.
Crv. P. 83. Prior to that time, local rules could be enacted without any record as to
what they were intended to address.
33. Compare Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1976) (holding, in
context of criminal prosecution, trial judge may sequester non-party witness during trial testimony, but holding order preventing testifying party/defendant from
consulting with his attorney during overnight recess to be violative of Sixth
Amendment right to counsel) with Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283-85 (1989)
(holding that criminal defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to consult with
counsel during 15-minute break in his testimony).
34. For a discussion of the "good" reasons (as opposed to the "bad" or the
"ugly") for attorney-client consultation during deposition, see infra notes 58-86
and accompanying text.
35. See Geders, 425 U.S. at 87-88. Geders drew a distinction between non-party
witnesses and testifying party/defendants, providing the testifying party/defendants with a greater right to counsel. Id. Oddly, the language of Geders appears to
have addressed consultations between a non-party witness and trial counsel, but
not the witness's own lawyer. Id. The court discussed sequestration orders as applied to non-party witnesses in the context of preventing discussions with "trial
counsel" only. Id.
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When?

The district courts also have taken varying approaches as to
when the prohibition applies, ranging in applicability from only
when a question is pending to extending into recesses and coffee
breaks. Some approaches are troubling due to the lack of clarity as
to when they apply. Drawing a distinction between recesses for coffee breaks and over-night breaks may seem silly. Yet the existence
of a constitutionally protected right to representation is dependent
upon drawing such a line that the United States Supreme Court has
referred to as "a line of constitutional dimension. '36 Therefore,
whether a no-consultation rule passes constitutional scrutiny de37
pends on the scope of its applicability.
The most narrow approach is to prohibit attorney-client consultations only when a question is pending.3 8 This would prevent
direct coaching as to a specific question. No constitutional infirmity is present with this limited prohibition. 39 The most far-reachextending the prohibition to "breaks" and
ing approach,
"recesses, '40 presents questions of constitutional dimension, dependent upon the length of the recess. 4 1 Another variation, perhaps in
an effort to avoid possible constitutional infirmity due to an overly
broad application to recesses, exempts the recesses from the prohibition and allows off-the-record conferences during recesses. 42 But,
36. See Leeke, 488 U.S. at 280-81 (holding testifying criminal defendant has
constitutionally protected right to conference with counsel during evening recess
but not during brief 15-minute recess).
37. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the no-consultation rules, see
infra notes 217-37 and accompanying text.
38. See S. DIST. OF INDIANA, RuLE 30.1, supra note 22 (prohibiting attorney
initiated conferences "regarding a pending question"); DIST. OF OREGON, RULE
230-5(d), supra note 22 (requiring that "[i]f a question is pending, it shall be answered before a recess is taken"); SECOND CIRCUIT PROPOSED RuLE 6, supra note 23
(prohibiting "defending attorney" from initiating conferences "during the pendency of a question").
39. For a discussion that there is no interference with the constitutionally protected right to counsel in prohibiting attorney-client consultations during testimony, see infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
40. See Hall Rule, supra note 22, at 531-32 (extending prohibition against offthe-record conferences to breaks and recesses).
41. For a discussion of why the prohibition of attorney-client conferences during overnight recesses violates the right to counsel, while a prohibition applied to
"brief recesses" has no constitutional infirmity, see infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
42. See N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RULE 5.23(B), supra note 23 (exempting "ordinary and necessary recesses taken during the deposition session, such as
lunch breaks and rest periods" from its prohibition on consultations, but clarifying
that recesses or breaks may not be called for purpose of initiating conference between attorney and client).
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the exemption extracts a troublesome cost. Consultations are not
prohibited during recesses, but the opposing party may inquire as
to the content of the consultation, even as to matters that would
otherwise be protected by attorney-client privilege. 43 As will be discussed, it is beyond the authority of the district court to remove or
rewrite the attorney-client privilege because of the resulting inconsistency with existing law of procedure and evidence. 44
The approach of several districts prohibits conferences during
the "actual taking of a deposition" 45 or "while the deposition is proceeding in session." 46 It is unclear whether these prohibitions only
apply while testimony is being given, or whether the scope is intended to reach recesses during the deposition. 47 Under the most
far-reaching interpretation of the "pendency of the deposition" language, the prohibition could be thought to extend past the conclusion of testimony and up to the time of signature of the transcript
by the deponent. 48 The lack of clarity as to scope of this approach
leaves the constitutionality of these variations equally unclear.
C.

What?

All no-consultation rules provide an exception for discussions
to determine whether to assert a privilege. 49 Nothing exists to indi43. For an example of a rule permitting counsel conferences during recesses,
but also permitting opposing counsel access to the content of the consultation, see
N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RuLE 5.23(C), supra note 23.
44. For a discussion of the limitations to the district courts' rule-making authority, see infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
45. See S./E. DIST. OF NEW YORK, RuLE 13, supra note 22; DIST. OF WYOMING,
RuLE 30(e), supra note 22.
46. M. DIST. OF NORTH CAROLINA, RuLE 204(b) (2) (iii), supra note 22.
47. Applying the prohibitions to recesses creates further confusion. May a
recess be called for the sole purpose of conferencing? Do prohibitions include a
ban on attorney-client lunches together if the deposition proceeds over the noon
hour or cups of coffee together during a morning or afternoon break unless they
maintain strict silence? Does the prohibition apply to the evening hours if the
deposition breaks for the evening to continue the following day?
48. This possible confusion is caused, in part, by the language of Rule 30(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the deponent to have
30 days after a transcript of the deposition becomes available to review the transcript and make changes to the transcript "in form and substance" prior to signing
the transcript. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(e). Rule 30(e) refers to this period of time prior
to the correction and signing of the deposition as "before completion of the deposition." Id. Therefore, if the deposition has not reached "completion" it is probably not "proceeding in session" but it might be considered to be within the "actual
taking." Id.
49. For a discussion of the privilege determination exception to the no-consultation rules, see supra notes 27-33.
The scope of discovery extends to "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... " FED. R. CIrv. P.
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cate the origin of this universally applied exception. This is puzzling because one of the most frequently made arguments in
support of the no-consultation rule is that it causes deposition testimony to proceed in the same manner as trial testimony. At trial, it
is doubtful that a recess would be granted routinely for attorney
and client to discuss whether to assert a privilege. Admittedly, at
trial many questions of privilege are most likely anticipated and addressed by a motion in limine, thereby eliminating the need for discussion during testimony. However, Rule 26(c) provides for an
analogous procedure at deposition for problems of potential privileges that are anticipated prior to deposition, obviating the need
for discussion and the exception.5 0 Nevertheless, the exception is
universally recognized by the varying formulations of the no-consultation rule.
While the privilege exception may be necessary to protect client interests, there are other compelling reasons for attorney-client
consultation which are not recognized by the no-consultation rule.
Most notably, the limited scope of the privilege inquiry exception
does not allow for an attorney to consult with his or her client when
an apparent error, whether inadvertent or fraudulent, appears in
client testimony. This overly restrictive aspect of the rule prevents
an attorney from aiding in the discovery process and from fulfilling
professional obligations. 5 1 It appears that this consequence was apparently not contemplated by the drafters of the various no-consultation rules, thereby illustrating the problematic nature of the local
rulemaking process.
D. Say What?
The difficulty with allowing any conference at all, of course, is
that when a conference takes place and a privilege is not asserted,
nothing is then put on the record to indicate that the purpose for
the conference was within the privilege inquiry exception. Perhaps
26(b) (1). To assert a claim that information sought to be discovered is subject to a
privilege, "the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of
the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a matter
that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other
parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection." FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b) (5).
50. See FEn. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (providing for protective order to be issued limiting scope of inquiry during discovery).
51. For a discussion of how overly restrictive no-consultation rules can be
counterproductive to goals of the economical and efficient discovery, as well as
interfering with an attorney's professional obligations, see infra notes 72-74, 75-86,
90-97 and accompanying text.
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the conference was for the allowed purpose of discussing whether a
privilege exists and whether it should be asserted. Perhaps it was
for the improper purpose of suggesting an answer or otherwise
coaching the witness. A further dilemma exists because attorneys
also have the opportunity during coffee breaks and recesses to
coach one's client as to what to say and how to say it. The nagging
problem, as perceived by the district courts that have adopted the
no-consultation rule, is how to know when an attorney has
52
breached his or her professional obligations.
The most far-reaching of the no-consultation rules presumes
that an attorney will act unethically if given the opportunity. Thus,
these rules allow intrusion into attorney-client conversations to determine whether the subject of the conversation was within allowable boundaries. Attorney-client consultations are made the subject
of inquiry by opposing counsel "regardless of whether such communication would otherwise have been protected by the attorney-client
or any other privilege."5 3 The price then of a cup of coffee had
together by attorney and client during a recess is a waiver of applicable privileges that would attach to any communication that took
place.
This redefining of the attorney-client privilege is fraught with
difficulties. First, it appears to exceed the rulemaking power of the
district courts in that a rule of privilege is created that is inconsistent with the scope of discovery defined in Rule 26.54 Second, it is
inconsistent with the federal common law of attorney-client privilege. 55 Third, in diversity actions where state law provides the
source of law for privileges, local rules of district courts impermissi52. For a discussion of how the no-consultation rule developed from a perception that rules of professional conduct are ineffective in controlling attorney conduct, see infra notes 238-49 and accompanying text.
53. N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RuLE 5.23(C), supra note 23, at 10-11; see
also Hall Rule, supra note 22, at 532 (making off-the-record conferences "proper
subject of inquiry by deposing counsel to ascertain whether there has been any
witness-coaching and, if so, what"). Though the text of the Hall Rule does not
specify whether such inquiry is intended to pierce any applicable privileges, the
accompanying opinion does not clarify that intention. Hall v. Clifton Precision,
150 F.R.D. 525, 529 n.7. (E.D. Pa. 1993). But see DIST. OF COLORADO RULE
30.1C(A.2), supra note 22 (making off-the-record conferences proper "subject for
inquiry" by opposing counsel, but only "to the extent it is not privileged").
54. For a discussion of how no-consultation rules that seek to limit the applicability of attorney-client privilege could conflict with the scope of discovery defined in Rule 26, see infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion that no-consultation rules would be in conflict with federal law if they are viewed as redefining the attorney-client privilege, see infra note
188 and accompanying text.
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bly redefine state privilege law. 56 Finally, redefining the attorneyclient privilege in order to check up on attorney behavior to determine if it comports with ethical norms at best represents a very dim
view of the profession. It sacrifices obligations of confidentiality
owed to clients because of mistrust of attorneys.
III. WHAT ARE THEY TALKING ABOUT? THE GOOD, BAD
AND THE UGLY

Regulation by local rule of attorney-client consultation during
deposition is premised on a view that what takes place in such consultations subverts the discovery process. 5 7 It is presumed that attorneys improperly suggest answers to clients or use consultations
to interrupt the questioning of the party conducting the deposition.
Yet, in fact there are other reasons and purposes for a consultation
during a deposition. Some of these reasons may actually aid the
discovery process, or are at least benign. Other reasons perhaps are
mandated by an attorney's professional obligations. The utility of a
flat prohibition on deposition consultation becomes questionable
when considering that helpful or mandated consultations also are
brought within the overly broad prohibition. Therefore, an examination of the reasons for which off-the-record conferences occur is
warranted as a starting point of discussion.
A.

The Good Reasons

1. Reassurance
An attorney representing a deponent may wish to consult with
his or her client for a reason no more sinister than "hand-holding."
It should not be assumed that all clients are slick corporate officers
wishing to take every opportunity for self-serving conduct. Parties
to litigation also include persons who have had no prior exposure
to litigation and for whom litigation can be stressful and intimidating. For them, lengthy questioning can be a very unpleasant experience because there is no judicial presence to rule on objections,
to moderate the tone or intensity of the questioning, and to afford
breaks when necessary. A consultation may be initiated simply for
the purpose of reassuring the client that "you're doing fine" and
56. For a discussion of how no-consultation rules alter the scope of the attorney-client privilege thereby creating an Erie problem in diversity actions, see infra
notes 189 and accompanying text.
57. For a discussion that the premise for the no-consultation rule is that any
attorney-client consultation during deposition will exceed ethical norms and in-

jure the discovery process, see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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"this will be over before too long, hang in there." The calming effect of reassuring words might actually aid the fact-finding
process. 58
In an era of increased concern for a lack of civility in the profession, it would seem consistent with that concern to allow a bit of
civility to the persons whom the profession serves. Surely, concerns
with civility must extend to how clients are treated as well as to how
lawyers treat each other. 59 Nevertheless, two counter-arguments
persist. First, depositions are meant to resemble trial testimony,
and a client may not consult with his or her attorney in the midst of
giving testimony at trial. Therefore, deposition consultations
should not be permitted. Second, some attorneys will use a consultation for the improper purpose of suggesting to the deponent how
to answer. Neither reason trumps the merit of the hand-holding
consultation. Depositions are not in fact the mirror images of trial
testimony,60 and other, more appropriate controls exist for addressing the attorney who uses consultations for improper purposes. 61
2.

Are Not Two Playing the Game?

In some respects, the no-consultation rule presumes that it is
only the deponent's attorney who is the perpetrator of abusive discovery conduct. Nevertheless, the questioning attorney also can
abuse the discovery process by badgering the deponent with insulting, abusive, repetitive or irrelevant questions. 62 Thus, the rule
works to put the deponent at the mercy of an abusive questioner
58. See Perry v. Leake, 488 U.S. 272, 292 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Vigorous cross-examination is certainly indispensable in discerning the trustworthiness of testimony, but I would think that a few soothing words from counsel to
the agitated or nervous defendant.., might increasethe likelihood that the defendant will state the truth on cross-examination.").
59. But cf FiNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 444 (reporting "the decline of civility
standards in litigation practice," but only discussing impact of incivility on clients

in economic terms);

INTERIM REPORT,

supra note 2, at 374, 384, 400 (containing

survey intended to assess "whether in fact civility problems exist in litigation practice in the Seventh Circuit" but concentrating on "Lawyers' Relations With Each
Other" and "Lawyers' Relations With Judges" and somewhat ignoring impact on
clients).
60. For a discussion of the differences between deposition and trial testimony,
see infra notes 120-63 and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of more appropriate methods of controlling the overzealous attorney during deposition consultations, see infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lauyer's Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
PrincipalProblems and Abuses, 4 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 859, 859 (1980) (stating "[a]s
one litigator phrased it, he used depositions to put hostile witnesses or opposing
parties 'through the wringer, through the mud, [so that] they are frightened to be
a witness and.. are a much worse witness' ").
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and prevents the deponent's attorney from performing important
roles in the attorney-client relationship. 63 Eggleston v. ChicagoJourneymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 13064 serves as an excellent example of opposing attorneys abusing the deposition process and the
need for off-the-record attorney-client (deponent) consultation
during the deposition. In Eggleston, five named plaintiffs brought
an action alleging employment discrimination and sought to represent a class of similarly situated African-American and Hispanic persons. 65 In depositions limited to issues of class certification, the
defendant conducted an inquiry that the court referred to as "a
totally unjustified and reprehensible intrusion into personal family
history. '66 The questioning included lengthy inquiry into the deponent's racial ancestry, including such questions as whether the deponent's grandmother had ever mentioned any Caucasian
ancestors, whether the deponent believed himself to be Hispanic or
African-American, and the deponent's basis for his belief as to his
67
racial identity.
The attorney's first recourse to such a repugnant assault on the
client is to object to the relevance of the question. 68 The objection,
however, is merely noted for the record and the question must still
be answered. 69 Instruction not to answer a question is limited to
where a privilege is asserted. 70 If the relevancy objection does not
get the point across to the questioner that this is an area into which
inquiry should not venture, the next and final recourse is to suspend the deposition and seek relief from the court limiting the
63. See, e.g., Acri v. Golden Triangle Management Acceptance Co., 142 Pitt.
Legal J. 225, 229 (Ct. C.P. 1994) (noting that problems at depositions also can be
caused by questioning attorney and criticizing Hall Rule because it forces deponent's attorney into position where he or she "sits quietly while responding counsel unfairlybeats up the client").
64. 657 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
65. Id. at 892.
66. Id. at 898.
67. Id. at 898 n.12 (setting out excerpts of deposition transcript).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1). Rule 30(d)(1) provides: "[a] ny objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative
and non-suggestive manner." Id.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c). Rule 30(c) provides: "[alll objections made at the
time of the examination.., to the evidence presented, to the conduct of any party,
or to any other aspect of the proceedings shall be noted by the officer upon the
record of the deposition; but the examination shall proceed, with the testimony
being taken subject to the objections." Id.
70. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(1). Rule 30(d)(1) further provides: "[a] party may
instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to
enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to present a motion
under paragraph (3)." Id. For the remaining text of Rule 30(d)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, see supra note 68.
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scope or manner of the deposition so as to preclude the offensive
71
inquiry.
If strictly interpreted, the no-consultation rule does not allow
for attorney-client conferences for the purpose of determining
whether the latter course of action should be pursued. This is
troublesome for two reasons. First, the client should be consulted
as to the extent to which the client feels harassed by offensive, irrelevant questioning. Though the questions are repugnant, the client
may find them a relatively minor annoyance and may simply wish to
get the deposition over with and not pursue a Rule 30(d) (3) motion. Alternatively, the deponent may have had enough and wish to
seek judicial relief from the abusive questioning. Second, it must
also be kept in mind that the motion seeking judicial relief is not
pursued without some economic risks to the client. 72 Therefore,
professional obligations would seem to require that the decision to
pursue Rule 30(d) (3) relief be made only after consultation with
the client as to the strategic and financial concerns involved in pursuing this course of action. 73 Strictly applied, the no-consultation
rule prevents fulfillment of this obligation, for the only exception
allowed is for the purpose of determining whether to assert a
74
privilege.

71. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3). Rule 30(d)(3) provides:
At any time during a deposition, on motion of a party or of the deponent
and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith
or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
deponent or party, the court ... may order the officer conducting the
examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit
the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule
26(c).
Id.
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Rule 37(a)(4) requires "party or deponent
whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred
in making the motion... unless the court finds that.., opposing party's nondisclosure . . . was substantially justified." Id.
73. See MODEL RuLms OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.4(b) (1994) (stating
that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation"); ANNOTATED
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 cmt., at 61 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that "[a] lawyer has the obligation not only to advise a client of his or her legal
rights and responsibilities but also to counsel the client regarding the advisability
of the action contemplated") (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1523 (1987)).
74. For a discussion of what is prohibited by the no-consultation rule, see
supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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Being Helpful

In addition to being subject to anxiety during deposition, a deponent simply may become confused and give inaccurate information because of nervousness or other reasons. A consultation can
address the confusion and result in the communication of more
accurate information to the party taking the deposition. 75 The consultation is initiated when the attorney hears the deponent give an
answer that does not comport with what the attorney believes to be
accurate. During the consultation, the attorney can make sure that
his or her client properly understood the question asked or properly recalls the information that the question seeks. 76 Without the
consultation occurring, the party conducting the deposition proceeds on the basis of inaccurate information. The mistake may
never become apparent, in which case the discovery process is subverted in the absence of consultation. Alternatively, the deponent's
error may be discovered as the deposition proceeds. If information
of sufficient significance is involved in the mistake or misunderstanding, a portion of the deposition must be repeated with the
corrected information in mind. 77 Prohibiting the consultation
could result in a needless expenditure of time and resources and
cut against the goals of economy that the no-consultation rule is
intended, in part, to foster.
In fact, rules of professional conduct would seem to dictate
75. It is often presumed that conferences during the deposition may take
place and are a part of the deposition process. See PhillipJ. Kolczynski, Depositions
As Evidence, 9 LrriT. 25, 29 (Winter 1983) ("The lawyer is permitted [during the
deposition] to talk to his client or his client's agents, of course.").
76. In my experience, client confusion with dates serves as a fine example of
client confusion that could easily be cleared up with a conference between attorney and deponent. The deposing attorney may have a mastery of the dates when
certain events occurred that far exceeds that of the deponent. Referring to events
by description rather than by date may confuse the deponent as to what event is
the subject of the inquiry and lead to seemingly inaccurate testimony.
77. If the misunderstanding is revealed at some point in the deposition, earlier portions may have to be repeated. Resources are wasted by the repetition.
Alternatively, if the misunderstanding is revealed after completion of the deposition, when the deponent exercises his or her right under Rule 30(e) to make corrections to the deposition transcript prior to signing it, the deposing party then
may reopen the deposition for further questioning on the point or points that
have been changed. Again, resources are unnecessarily wasted. See Sanford v.
CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (stating that when changes made
to deposition pursuant to Rule 30(e) make record "incomplete or useless without
further testimony," deposition may be reopened by party who took deposition and
party making changes will bear expense of reopening); Erstad v. Curtis Bay Towing
Co., 28 F.R.D. 583, 584 (D. Md. 1961) (discussing that changes to deposition transcript "may call for further questioning.., or the continuation of the deposition to
some future date").
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that the foregoing take place. An attorney has an obligation of candor toward the tribunal that compels the attorney to "take reasonable remedial measures" if evidence is offered "that the lawyer
knows to be false."7 8 That obligation extends to discovery generally
and specifically to deposition testimony. 79 Nevertheless, while
Model Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct speaks only
in terms of "false evidence," the accompanying commentary and
Formal Opinion 93-376 of the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility address situations
where the lawyer's client deliberately gives inaccurate responses to
questions at deposition. Therefore, it is somewhat unclear whether
inadvertent false statements are also contemplated by the rule. 80
It is here that the two most commonly mentioned purposes of
depositions lead to different conclusions. It is often stated that the
purposes of depositions are to obtain accurate information and to
preserve testimony. 81 Facilitating accurate fact gathering certainly
speaks to bringing inadvertent false statements within Model Rule
3.3. The Rule 30(e) post-deposition correction of deposition transcripts prior to signature would indicate that the ultimate goal of
discovery by deposition is to provide for the exchange of accurate
information. 82 Therefore, a deponent may correct the record prior
78. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1994). Rule
3.3, entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal" requires that: "A lawyer shall not knowingly.., offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures." Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1
(1994). Rule 4.1, entitled "Truthfulness in Statements to Others" states:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person;
or

(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
Id.
79. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93376 (Aug. 6, 1993) (clarifying that lawyer's obligation of candor to tribunal applies

in pretrial situation of testimony offered at deposition and later discovered by lawyer to be false).
80. It would seem that fraudulent statements are a much more troublesome
case than inadvertent false statements. Therefore, inadvertent false statements
should be treated like fraudulent statements and the lawyer should be able to initiate a conference to correct them.
81. See SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF DEPOSITIONS, supra note
18, at 613 (issuing report that proposes no-consultation rule and stating that

"[underlying this report is an assumption that the purpose of depositions is to
obtain facts and preserve testimony").
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(e) (providing that deponent shall have 30 days to review
deposition transcript and make "changes in form or substance").
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to adopting it as his or her testimony and may consult with counsel
in the process of so doing.83 Similarly, inadvertent inaccuracies
known to the attorney would also require correction.
The deposition purpose of preserving testimony, however,
could lead to the opposite conclusion and not require correction of
inaccuracies during the deposition. The goal of committing a deponent to a certain version of a story is not so much concerned with
the accuracy of the story as it is concerned with committing the
witness to a story.8 4 When the witness testifies at trial, any changes
in the witness's recitation of events can be used as impeachment
fodder. 85 Having been committed to the story, the deponent can
then be later impeached, either with the deponent's own changed
testimony, or with impeaching testimony of other witnesses whose
story is different from the deponent's.
Nevertheless, both discovery purposes are served by mid-deposition correction of inadvertent inaccuracies. As will be discussed,
consultation to correct inadvertent false statements amounts to little more than the allowed post-deposition correction of the record
provided for in Rule 30(e).86 By accelerating the correction to a
point in time that allows for immediate follow-up based on the corrected information, interests of economy in discovery are served
without prejudicing the proponent of the question. Even for attorneys who do not feel compelled to fulfill professional obligations, it
is not farfetched to think that they, in defending a deposition,
would consult with clients to aid the discovery process. The possibility of later impeachment with the deposition record constitutes a
large incentive to ensure that the record is complete and accurate.
B.

The Bad Reasons

In considering no-consultation rules, one, of course, should
not be so much of a "Pollyanna" as to suggest that all deposition
consultations are for purposes that aid in the process of accurate
fact-finding. Lawyers also initiate consultations to suggest to a cli83. See, e.g., Erstad v. Curtis Bay Towing Co., 28 F.R.D. 583, 584 (D. Md. 1961)

(holding that attorney and client may engage in private conference before
changes are made to deposition record).
84. See THoMAs A. MAUET, PRETRiAL 237 (3d ed. 1995) (noting that "a deposition commits the deponent to the details of his story" is one of several factors that
makes depositions "by far the most effective discovery device").
85. See FED. R. EVID. 613(a) (allowing for impeachment of witness with prior
inconsistent statement); FED. R. EVlD. 613(b) (allowing for impeachment of witness with extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement).
86. For a discussion of correcting the record of a deposition pursuant to Rule
30(e), see infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss4/2

20

Taylor: Rambo as Potted Plant: Local Rulemaking's Preemptive Strike again
1995]

RAMBO

As POTTED PLANT

1077

ent what to answer or how to answer, as well as to interrupt the
interrogation of the attorney conducting the deposition. The reporters and the media are replete with examples of such improper
conduct, many of which demonstrate a highly developed, adolescent flair for the profane and the scatological, as well as threats of
Rambo-esque violence.8 7 Certainly, such conduct subverts the discovery process. Time and expense are wasted. The client's ends
are not well served. The profession as a whole suffers.
This behavior should not be allowed to persist without repercussions. But local rules prohibiting all attorney-client conferences
are not the appropriate mechanism for controlling it. An attorney
engaging in the practice of suggesting answers to his or her client is
in violation of established rules of professional conduct. 88 Therefore, a local rule prohibiting consultation is not adding any new
proscription to attorney behavior. It is an attempt to take away the
opportunity to engage in obviously prohibited behavior. This approach might be warranted in the absence of appropriate reasons
for off-the-record conferences, or if a significant number of attorneys are using conferences to subvert the deposition process. 89
Neither are the case. Therefore, no-consultation rules cut far too
wide a path through the attorney-client relationship.
87. See David C. Weiner, Civility, 21 LrrIG. 1 (1994). Weiner provides an exchange which "actually occurred between two very prominent attorneys" that artfully captures almost all forms of abusive conduct in one short conversation
between the attorneys and the deponent:
Attorney A: You don't run this deposition, you understand?
Attorney B: Neither do you, Joe.
Attorney A: You watch and see. You watch and see who does, big boy.
And don't be telling other lawyers to shut up. This isn't.your g- d.job,
fat boy.
Attorney B: Well, that's not your job, Mr. Hairpiece.
Witness: As I said before, you have an incipient...
Attorney A: What do you want to do about it, a.h.?
Attorney B: You're not going to bully this guy.
Attorney A: Oh, you big fat tub of s-, sit down.
Attorney B: I don't care how many of you come up against me.
Attorney A: Oh, you big fat tub of s-, sit down. Sit down, you big fat tub
of s-,
Id. at 1.
88. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (1994) (insuring fairness to opposing counsel by mandating access to evidence and prohibiting
influencing of witnesses).
89. For a discussion of the appropriate reasons for off-the-record conferences,
see supranotes 58-86 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the lack of empirical data supporting the no-consultation rule, see infra notes 100-113 and accompanying text.
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The Ugly Reasons

There is one other reason why an attorney would want to consult or be required to consult with his or her client during deposition-one that is commanded by professional obligations. In the
event that the lawyer believes that his or her client has given an
intentionally inaccurate answer to a question at deposition, the lawyer has an obligation to correct the fraud.90 If the lawyer is aware of
the fraud during the deposition, "the lawyer's first step should be to
remonstrate with the client confidentially and urge him [or her] to
rectify the situation." 91 A blanket prohibition on deposition consultation would prevent such remonstrations.
The lawyer, if prevented from this "first step" during the deposition, can wait until the conclusion of the deposition and urge the
client to correct the fraud as part of the transcript review and signature process. 92 But this would result in an unnecessary waste of
time and resources if the misstatement concerned a material fact
such that the party conducting the deposition would have been misled in any subsequent inquiry. Leaving the misstatement uncorrected would be a violation of the obligation not to subvert the
truth-finding process. 93 Correcting the misstatement when it occurred could obviate the need of having to reconvene the deposi94
tion after correction of the record.
Those formulations of the no-consultation rule that make any
consultation presumptively improper and subject to inquiry by the
opposing party without regard to any available privilege are particularly troublesome for the attorney seeking to fulfill the professional
obligations of Model Rule 3.3. When confronted with a client
wrongdoing at deposition, the lawyer, if possible, is to consult with
the client to the end of rectifying the falsehood "without divulging
the client's wrongdoing or breaching the client's confidences." 95 A
local rule that makes any consultation fair game for inquiry without
90. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1994). For
the applicable text of Rule 3.3, see supra note 78.
91. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93376, at 1 (Aug. 6, 1993) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 93-376] (discussing "The
Lawyer's Obligation Where a Client Lies in Response to Discovery Requests").
92. For a discussion of the correction of deposition transcripts by the deponent pursuant to Rule 30(e), see infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
93. See ABA Formal Op. 93-376, supra note 91, at 1 (noting that fraud is committed upon tribunal by false statement at deposition even before filing with court
because of ongoing reliance upon deception).
94. For a discussion of the need to repeat deposition testimony due to mistake as a wasteful exercise, see supra note 77.
95. ABA Formal Op. 93-376, supra note 91, at 1.
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regard to existing privileges makes it impossible to rectify the client's wrongdoing without removing the protection of confidentiality from the consultation. 96 The attorney then is placed in a
dilemma where fulfillment of obligations to the tribunal result in
97
violation of obligations to preserve confidentiality.
IV.

LOOK

WHO'S

TALING, PLEASE!

The no-consultation rule is premised on the notion that attorneys representing deponents will subvert the discovery process by
improperly coaching the deponent as to what to say if given the
opportunity. 98 The assumption is that attorneys will ignore applicable rules of professional conduct and act unethically.99 A local rule
96. The language quoted from Formal Opinion 93-376 at the preceding note

contains a puzzling caveat. In its entirety, the quoted language states:
Thus, the lawyer's first step should be to remonstrate with the client confidentially and urge him to rectify the situation. It may develop that, after
consultation with the client, the lawyer will be in a position to accomplish
rectification without divulging the client's wrongdoing or breaching the
client's confidences, depending upon the rules of the jurisdictionand the nature of the false evidence.
Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
It is unclear what portion of the lawyer's first step is dependent upon the rules
of the jurisdiction. The placement of the phrase would lead one to believe that
avoiding a breach of the client's confidences is dependent upon local rules.
Therefore, the argument made in the text would be defeated. Nevertheless, the
Committee previously had struggled with the tension between preserving client
confidences and disclosing client perjury, coming to the conclusion that the obligation to the tribunal supersedes the obligation to the client. ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987). Formal Opinion 93-376, however, still seeks to preserve client confidences, if it all possible while
rectifying the fraud. ABA Formal Op. 93-376, supra note 91. It would seem odd
for the Committee to subject the obligation to preserve client confidences to the
whim of local court rule.
97. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994) (defining
lawyer's duty of confidentiality).
98. See N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RULE 5.23B, supra note 23 (providing
purpose for proposed no-consultation rule "to prevent counsel for a deponent
from improperly suggesting answers or the content of testimony to a witness and to
prevent disruption of the deposition"); SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT ON THE CONDUCT
OF DEPOSITIONS, supra note 18, at 613 (stating that "genesis" for set of proposed
discovery rules on discovery conduct, including no-consultation rule, is "that the
current method of taking and defending depositions is too often an exercise in
competitive obstructionism"); Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) (holding that "a lawyer and a client do not have an absolute right to
confer during the course of the client's deposition" because "[t]he witness comes
to the deposition to testify, not to indulge in a parody of Charlie McCarthy, with
lawyers coaching or bending the witness's words to mold a legally convenient
record").
99. Suggesting answers to a deponent would violate several of a lawyer's professional obligations. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)
(1994) (providing that "a lawyer shall not knowingly ... offer evidence that the
lawyer knows to be false"); MODEL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4
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that seeks to take away the opportunity to act unethically is the
next, or perhaps the last, step. This is quite an indictment of the
profession. One then questions the validity of the premise.
The limited material available concerning the considerations
involved in the enactment of the various no-consultation rules does
not indicate that any concrete data supports the premise.10 0 The
proposal of the Committee on Second Circuit Courts states that the
Committee "spoke with a number of judges, magistrates and practitioners," but it does not appear that any scientifically supportable
survey was undertaken or that any reliable empirical data was gathered. Rather, anecdotal observations were gleaned from a handful
of lawyers in a limited geographic region.1 0 1 Even then, the Committee conceded that those lawyers interviewed did not share a uniform belief that a widespread problem existed with the conduct of
depositions.10 2 Nevertheless, the Committee proceeded to propose
rules on deposition conduct addressing "concern areas which have
been identified as giving rise to frequent problems" though the
10 3
identification process is subject to serious question.
The approach taken by the Committee's no-consultation proposal is of equally questionable origin. 10 4 The Committee concedes
(1994) (providing that "a lawyer shall not ... falsify evidence, counsel or assist a
witness to testify falsely"; or, "in pretrial procedure . . . fail to make reasonably
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request"); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1994) (providing that "a lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false statement of material fact.., to a third person").
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (1994). The statutory source of authority for
local rulemaking by district courts was amended in 1988 to provide for public notice and comment prior to a rule taking effect. Thus, rules proposed after 1988
provide the best resources of what considerations went into the promulgation of
the rule. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 83. (allowing creation and amendment of district
court rules after giving public notice and comment opportunity).
101. See FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS MNORITY REPORT ON CONDUCT OF DEPOSITIONS, 131 F.R.D. 625 (May 1990) [hereinaf-

ter MINORrrv REPORT]

(criticizing observations

gathered

by committee

for

contacting lawyers located only in Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and
completely overlooking lawyers in Northern and Western Districts of New York,
District of Connecticut and District of Vermont).
102. See SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT

ON THE CONDUCT OF DEPOSITIONS,

supranote

18, at 614 (stating that litigators interviewed thought "that depositions have become encrusted with too much unproductive posturing"); MINORmr' REPORT, supra
note 101, at 625 (disagreeing with Committee Report that deposition practice
amounts to "an exercise in competitive obstructionism," and instead believing that
conduct of depositions in Southern and Eastern Districts of New York reflects "a
proper balance of courtesy and professionalism toward the adversary counsel, and
diligent representation of their own clients' interests").
103. SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF DEPOSITIONS, supra note
18, at 616.
104. See SECOND CIRCUIT PROPOSED RULE 6, supra note 23.
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that " [ n] o subject has generated more controversy" than the extent
of the no consultation rule, and that "there is a wide range of views
10 5
concerning what is the ideal degree of availability of counsel."
Yet, the Committee never addressed the various approaches. 10 6 No
reasoning is offered for why the Committee chose the specific approach contained in the proposal other than a reference to the
same approach having been taken or proposed elsewhere. 10 7 The
committee offered little discussion to reflect that any of the troublesome issues involved were considered.1 08
Similarly, the proposal of the Northern District of Illinois also
lacks a basis for the premise that attorney-client consultation during
depositions is subverting the discovery process and that control by
local rule is needed. Nevertheless, the court commented that,
although its proposed no-consultation rule is "controversial," "there
is an urgent need for a bright line rule... in order to prohibit any
communication that would improperly interrupt the deposition
and jeopardize the truth-finding process."1 0 9
The basis for the determination of "urgent need" is quite suspect. The Northern District created a Committee on Deposition
Practice "to develop a set of guidelines for use by attorneys in the
conduct of depositions."' 1 0 Apparently the Committee proceeded
from the assumption that some form of guidelines was necessary,
rather than undertaking a study of whether any in fact were
needed. Two studies on "incivility" in practice are cited to establish
that abusive conduct occurs at depositions and that there is a need
for deposition guidelines, yet neither actually addressed the specific
105. SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF DEPOSITIONS, supra note

18, at 618.
106. For a discussion of the various approaches taken by district courts that
have proposed or adopted no-consultation rules, see supra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
107. See SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF DEPOSITIONS, supranote

18, at 618 n.8 (stating that same rule was also proposed in "A Proposed Code of
Litigation Conduct," The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, at 738 (Aug. 1988)); id. (offering same rule as sample in MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 1985) and adopted by Eastern District of New York Standing Order 13).
108. See id. at 618 n.8 (offering as sole consideration of underlying issues that
no-consultation rule causes deposition to be similar to cross-examination at trial

and citing Perry v. Leake, 488 U.S. 272 (1989)).
109. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSAL TO ADOPT LOCAL RULES, COMMENT BY THE COURT TO RULE 5,23 (May 24, 1995).

110. See REPORT OF COMMrITEE ON DEPOSITION PRACTICE, Jan. 18, 1995, Introduction [hereinafter REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON DEPOSITION PRACTICE]. The Committee was created by General Order entered on March 15, 1995 by Chief Judge
James B. Moran pursuant to the CivilJustice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994).
Id. at 1.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 2
1082

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40: p. 1057

conduct that is the subject of the no-consultation rule."' Additionally, the Committee cites two cases, each of which expressed disapproval of attorney-client conferences during deposition. 12 Neither
case provides any support for the practice being widespread nor
presenting a difficulty outside the specific context before the court.
Nevertheless, the Committee finds that "[m] any attorneys have felt
the frustration when after recess, a deponent, clearly parroting the
113
words of counsel, reverses or explains away prior testimony."
Who the "many" are and what source supports that finding is not
identified.
The Committee did engage in a fairly extensive discussion of
the "pros and cons" of the no-consultation rule and its possible formulations.11 4 It attempted to address the underlying issues
111. Id. at 1-2 (introduction) (citing FINAL REPORT OF THE CML JUSTICE REACT ADVISORY GROUP at 49-50) (finding that incivility is "prevalent" theme in
depositions and listing areas of deposition conduct for which local rules should be
drafted, but not including attorney-client conferences at deposition); see also id. at
22 (Arguments In Favor of Restricting Deponent-Attorney Communications) (citing THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVILrry OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 143 F.R.D. 371, 388 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT ON
CIVILrIY] (noting that among discovery abuses was "[a]busive and unethical conduct re: coaching of witnesses during deposition question and answer")).
The Interim Report on Civility conducted a survey of 580 lawyers in the Seventh Circuit. INTERIM REPORT ON CIVILITY, sup-a, at 378. Whether coaching of
witnesses was occurring during attorney-client conferences is not clarified. In fact,
the question on the survey addressing the topic asked only if there is a "civility"
problem in "discovery proceedings." Id. at 428, #5a. There is no specific inquiry as
to even "coaching of witnesses," let alone coaching through attorney-client conferences. Id. The reference in the Report to coaching of witnesses as abusive discovery conduct was apparently based on the anecdotal written comments received
with "scores" of survey responses. Id. at 388. Nevertheless, there is no mention of
any comment addressing attorney-client conferences as "abusive conduct."
The reliance upon the Interim Report on Civility is particularly curious in
light of the comments of the Committee Chair, Hon. Marvin E. Aspen, District
Court Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
made while participating in a panel discussion on "The Rambo Litigator" where he
stated: "It's a rare thing to see Rambo tactics. The vast majority, overwhelming
majority of lawyers practice professionally and competently in my courtroom."
FORM

THE TENTH ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 146 F.R.D. 205, 230 (1992). It seems as if the

proposal on deposition conduct of the Northern District of Illinois is aimed at
unidentified conduct engaged in by a very small number of practitioners.
112. REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON DEPOSITION PRACTICE, supra note 110, at 22
(citing Hall v. Clifton, 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 901 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (holding off-the-record conferences at deposition to
be improper where deponents and their counsel conferred "an estimated 127"
times)).
113. REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON DEPOSITION PRACTICE, supra note 110, at 21-23
("Arguments In Favor of Restricting Deponent-Attorney Communications").
114. Id. at 21-25 ("Arguments In Favor of Restricting Deponent-Attorney
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presented by the rule. Nevertheless, many of the key issues are
overlooked: such as the reordering of attorney-client privilege;1 1 5
and how the attorney confronted with inaccurate information having been given by his or her client is to correct the inaccuracy without the ability to conference with him or her.11 6 These omissions
speak to the problems inherent in local rulemaking that hastily ven11 7
tures into territory beyond matters of local "housekeeping."
What is woefully lacking is any reliable empirical data, study or
survey demonstrating the need for a no-consultation rule. The basis is simply a handful of anecdotal observations. This lack would
not be so troublesome were there not legitimate reasons for attorney-client conferences during deposition, as well as reasons mandated by professional obligations.1 18 If the no-consultation rule did
not so heavily intrude into the attorney-client relationship, in some
formulations even removing the protection of privilege from confidential conversations, this hasty, unsupported jumping on the "incivility" bandwagon might not seem so unjustified.1 19 In light of the
foregoing, an empirical study should be undertaken before proceeding with the enactment of such a sweeping change in the nature of the attorney-client relationship.
V. AND LOOK WHERE THEY'RE

TALKING

A commonly made argument in support of the no-consultation
rule is that direct examination at deposition is the analogue of
cross-examination at trial.1 20 Because a witness at trial may not consult with his or her attorney during the actual examination, and
Communications" and "Arguments Against Restricting Deponent-Attorney
Communications").
115. For a discussion of how no-consultation rules can seek to redefine the
attorney-client privilege, see infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of how a consultation during a deposition can facilitate
efficient discovery by providing the opportunity to correct inaccurate testimony,
see supra notes 75-86, 90-97 and accompanying text.
117. See WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 62, at 431-32 (criticizing local rulemaking as
threat to uniformity of procedure that has been adopted in "a casual manner," and
stating that "[allmost every study of experience with local rules has demonstrated
how unsatisfactory it has been").
118. For a discussion of the reasons, "good," "bad" and "ugly," why an attorney and client would engage in a conference during a deposition, see supranotes
57-97 and accompanying text.
119. For a discussion of those forms of the no-consultation rules that remove
the protection of privilege from attorney-client off-the-record conferences held
during deposition, see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of how no-consultation rules are wrongly premised on a
false analogy between depositions and cross-examinations, see infra notes 134-63
and accompanying text.
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possibly during recesses, a deponent must be held to the same restriction. The difficulty with this argument is that cross-examination at trial and questioning of a witness at deposition are not the
same in either form or function. Therefore, the analogy is but another false premise for the no-consultation rule.
A.

The Form of Depositions

Several major differences cause depositions to be very different
creatures than cross-examinations at trial and reveal the analogy to
be inaccurate. First,1 2 1 depositions take place outside of any judicial presence. Therefore, rulings on objections cannot be made
when raised and no one is present to protect the witness in the
event that the questioning becomes abusive. 122 Objections are
merely noted on the record for later ruling, if necessary. 12 3 Second, the scope of questioning is much broader than cross-examination at trial.1 24 Cross-examination is limited in scope to the "subject
26
matter" of the preceding direct examination 25 and by relevancy.'
The scope of discovery is not limited to that which is admissible
evidence, but rather extends more broadly to any matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the action. 12 7 Additionally, the strategic considerations involved in cross-examination at trial serve as a
more significant limit on the scope of inquiry. The commonly
heard rule of cross-examination is "never ask a question to which
you do not know the answer."'128 The opposite rule holds for depo121. It is very difficult to make ajudgment as to the order of significance, and
the order of discussion is not meant to imply any rank.

122. See, e.g.,

REPORT OF COMMrITEE ON DEPOSITION PRACTICE,

supra note 110,

at 23-24 (noting that "there is no judge at depositions who can deal with an obviously frightened or confused witness. .. there is no judge present to rule on, and
protect witnesses from, objectionable questions").
123. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(c) (providing that "[a]ll objections made at the time of
the examination ... shall be noted by the officer upon the record of the deposition; but the examination shall proceed").
124. See, e.g., REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON DEPOSITION PRACTICE, supranote 110,
at 24 (noting that "[t]he scope of deposition testimony is broader [than trial testimony], both because of the broad 'relevant to the subject matter' discovery standard that governs depositions and because there is no judge present to rule on,
and protect witnesses from, objectionable questions").

125.

FED.

R.

EVID.

611(b).

126. FED. R. EvID. 402. Relevance is defined as "having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.
EVID. 401.
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) (extending scope of discovery to "any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved").
128. See, e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 216 (3d
ed. 1992) (stating as one of "rules" of cross-examination that "your questions
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sition. The purpose is to inquire into every area possible to best
determine the strengths and weaknesses of the case. 129 This is done
without the limitation of preceding direct examination determining the applicable scope.
Taken together, these differences provide an atmosphere fertile for disputes during deposition. 130 Wide-ranging questioning is
pursued without the presence of a neutral party to referee disputes
which may arise, especially when the questioning intrudes upon
sensitive areas or becomes abusive. 1 3 ' At trial, the presence of a
judge to rule on objections, limit areas of inquiry and protect the
witness from undue abuse, supplants the need for attorney-client
conferences for purposes of protecting the witness as may be necessary at deposition.' 3 2 Nevertheless, if the purpose or function of a
deposition is identical to that of cross-examination, preventing attorney-client conferences indeed may be warranted to prevent un33
due coaching of the witness.1
B.

The Function of Depositions

It is commonly stated that the purpose of a deposition is to
obtain facts and preserve testimony.13 4 It is the perceived testimoshould tread on safe ground, by asking questions that you know the witness will
answer in a certain way").
129. SeeJames W. McElhaney, Basic Deposition Techniques, 21 LrriG. 1, 43 (Fall
1994) (stating that in discovery deposition "you want to learn as much as possible
about the case and find out what the witness has to say").
130. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No.
130, 657 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981) (discussing how "[w]ith a liberal interpretation [of relevancy] comes the risk of abuse and good faith differences of opinion"); Milton Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1978)
(discussing history of discovery and how decrease in judicial involvement has contributed to increase in discovery abuse).
131. SeeAcri v. Golden Triangle Management Acceptance Co., 142 Pitt. Legal
J. 225, 228-30 (Ct. C.P. 1994) (declining to impose no-consultation rule and discussing at length need for attorney-client conferences to "protect" client from abusive attorney who asks offensive and abusive questions).
132. For a discussion of situations at deposition where a conference could be
used to protect the deponent from abusive questioning, see supra notes 62-74 and
accompanying text.
133. It is difficult to reconcile the exception from the no-consultation rule for
discussions related to privilege assertions with the depositions as analogue of trial
justification for the rule. For a discussion of the exemption for the purpose of
determining whether or not to assert a privilege from the prohibition on conferences during depositions, see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(stating as purposes of discovery to "elicit facts" and "memorialization . . . of a
witness's testimony"); SECOND CIRcuIr REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF DEPOSITIONS,
supra note 18, at 613 (stating that "[u]nderlying this report is the assumption that
the purpose of depositions is to obtain facts and preserve testimony").
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nial preservation function that has misled drafters of no-consultation rules. Because attorney-client conferences are not held during
testimony at trial, it is then analogized that they should not be allowed during depositions.1 3 5 Nevertheless, the use of deposition
testimony at trial is not so much a purpose of depositions; instead,
it is an allowed use in somewhat exceptional circumstances. A
closer examination of depositions reveals that the primary purpose
is fact gathering. Other perceived purposes should not be relied
upon tojustify the no-consultation rule, especially when it so significantly intrudes upon the attorney-client relationship.
Nothing separates the fact-gathering function from the testimonial preservation function more than Rule 30(e), which allows a
deponent to review the transcript of his or her deposition and make
any desired changes in "form or substance."13 6 Although some
courts have limited allowable changes to transcription errors,1 3 7 the
more widely held approach is to follow the words of Rule 30(e) and
not to impose any limitation on either "form or substance" on the
nature of the deponent's changes.13 8 If testimonial preservation
were a primary purpose of depositions, changes to transcripts
would have no function. It is because the primary purpose is to
13 9
gather accurate facts that changes to the transcript are allowed.
This does not mean, however, that wholesale changes could be
made to a deponent's testimony without any ramification. The
original testimony remains part of the record and is available for
135. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEPOSITION PRAcrICE, supra note 110,
at 22 ("As a general rule, once a witness takes the stand at trial, communications
with counsel are prohibited until the testimony has been completed. Since deposition testimony is often admissible at trial, the same rule should be applicable at
depositions.").
136. FED. R. Clv. P. 30(e) (providing that "[i]f requested by the deponent or a
party before the completion of the deposition, the deponent shall have 30 days
after being notified by the officer that the transcript is available in which to review
the transcript or recording").
137. See, e.g., Greenway v. International Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D.
La. 1992) (holding that purpose of Rule 30(e) is to correct "substantive errors"
made by reporter but that Rule 30(e) "cannot be interpreted to allow one to alter
what was said under oath").
138. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua Eng'g, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 565,
566-67 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that "under the Rule [30(e)], changed deposition answers of any sort are permissible, even those which are contradictory or
unconvincing") (citing Perkasie Indus. Corp. v. Advance Transformer, Inc., No.
90-7359, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22431, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Sanford v. CBS, Inc.,
594 F. Supp. 713, 714-15 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641
(N.D. Ill. 1981)).
139. See, e.g., SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless, Ltd., 156 F.R.D. 529, 535 (D.D.C.
1994) ("[I]t is readily apparent that [Rule 30(e)] is geared toward correcting factual statements .... ").
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impeachment purposes. 140 The changes by the deponent are
noted with stated reasons for making them.1 4 1 In the event that the
changes are significant, the deposition may be reopened at the expense of the deponent whose changes necessitated the reopening. 142 As discussed, attorney-client conferences during deposition
can provide a more economical factual correction than waiting for
143
review of the transcript.
There are two testimonial uses of depositions taken in the
same proceeding, but neither is frustrated by attorney-client conferences. 144 First, depositions commit the witness to a specific version
of his or her story and may be used to impeach the witness at trial if
he or she strays from the previous testimony. 145 The ability to
coach the witness during attorney-client conferencing does not
lessen the impeachment value of the deposition testimony. When a
deponent exercises his or her right under Rule 30(e) to make corrections to the record, the impeachment value is not lost. Though
140. See, e.g., id. at 536 (stating that "changes under Rule 30(e) are added to
the original, and the clarification remains available to be used for impeachment or
further clarification") (citing Usiak v. New York Tank Bridge Co., 299 F.2d 808,
810 (2d Cir. 1962); Lugtig, 89 F.R.D. at 641-42 (explaining that "[n]othing in the
language of Rule 30(e) requires or implies that the original answers are to be
stricken when changes are made," and that a witness who changes his answers "may
be impeached by his former answers") (citing 8A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2118 (1980)).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(e) (providing that if changes are made by deponent to
record of deposition, a statement shall state reasons given by deponent for making
them); see also PiquaEng'g,152 F.R.D. at 568-74 (including, as example, attachment
providing deposition record containing changes and stated reasons therefore).
142. See, e.g., Sanford, 594 F. Supp. at 714-15 (stating that when changes made
to deposition pursuant to Rule 30(e) make record "incomplete or useless without
further testimony," deposition may be reopened by party who took deposition, and
party having made changes will bear the expense of reopening); Erstad v. Curtis
Bay Towing Co., 28 F.R.D. 583, 583 (D. Md. 1961) (discussing that changes to the
deposition transcript "may call for further questioning... or for continuation of
deposition to some future date").
143. For a discussion of the use of attorney-client conferences during deposition to correct factual errors in the deponent's testimony, see supra notes 75-86
and accompanying text.
144. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32 (setting forth "Use of Depositions in Court Proceedings"). A deposition taken in a previous action may also be used at trial as provided in Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. Civ. P.
32(a) (4) (providing that depositions from previous actions may be used as set
forth in Federal Rules of Evidence); FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (1) (exempting deposition testimony taken in different proceeding from exclusion as impermissible
hearsay if party against whom it is offered had opportunity and similar motive to
examine deponent in that proceeding).
145. See FED. R. CIv. P. 32(a) (1) (stating that "[a]ny deposition may be used
by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness, or for any other purpose permitted by the Federal Rules of
Evidence").
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the correction is made, the original statement also remains part of
the record, and the change in the testimony is available for impeachment purposes to show a prior inconsistency, a wavering witness, or both. 146 Similarly, the deposition record should reflect that
the attorney and deponent held an off-the-record conference and
any subsequent answer could be shown to the trier of fact to be
147
suspect.
Depositions also have a testimonial use in the event the deponent is unavailable to testify at trial due to death, distance, disability, inability of service of process, or other exceptional
circumstances. 148 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not distinguish between "discovery depositions" and "evidentiary depositions."1 49 Any deposition taken for the usual fact gathering
purposes of discovery can also be used for evidentiary purposes if
the requirements of Rule 32(a) (3) are met. 150 Perhaps because in
this use the record serves as a substitute for trial testimony, the proponents of the no-consultation rule mistakenly seek to make the
conduct of depositions the same as the conduct of trial testimony.
In jurisdictions that have preserved the distinction between evidentiary and testimonial depositions, different procedures and expectations of attorney conduct also are preserved.1 5 1 It is only the
146. For a discussion of Rule 30(e) regarding the use of corrections to the
depositions transcript for purpose of impeachment, see supra note 140.
147. See Kolczynski, supra note 75, at 29 (discussing that "[t] he best way to
discourage coaching is to put it on the record . . . [tlhe weight given to postconference testimony may be diminished if the court or jury believes the witness
was not providing his own independent and unaided recollection of the facts").
148. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (3) (A)-(E) (outlining circumstances of witness
unavailability that, if applicable, allow for deposition of witness, whether or not a
party, to be used by any party for any purpose); see also FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (1)
(exempting from exclusion as impermissible hearsay deposition testimony if party
against whom it is offered had opportunity and similar motive to examine deponent in that proceeding).
149. See, e.g., Tatman v. Collins, 938 F.2d 509, 510 (4th Cir. 1991) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make no distinction for use of a deposition at trial
between one taken for discovery purposes and one taken for use at trial (de bene
esse)."); United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (providing historical explanation of elimination of distinction between discovery depositions and evidentiary depositions).
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3) (providing that "[t)he deposition of a witness,
whether a party or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose" provided
that certain conditions of unavailability are met); see also Savoie v. Lafourche Boat
Rentals, Inc., 627 F.2d 722, 724 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that there is no authority
"in support of the proposition that discovery depositions may not be used at trial
against the party who conducted them").
151. See generally McElhaney, supra note 129, at 43 ("An evidence deposition is
completely different [than a discovery deposition]. Then you are not discovering
anything but actually presenting part of your case before trial, typically with your
own witness.").
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evidentiary deposition that proceeds in the same manner as testimony at trial. The State of Illinois serves as a good example. The
notice of deposition must specify whether the deposition is to be a
discovery deposition or an evidentiary deposition. 152 If both are desired of the same witness, they must be taken separately.' 53 The
scope and manner of taking the two forms of deposition are not the
same. A discovery deposition has the same broad scope contemplated for discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 54
An evidentiary deposition is more narrow in scope and "the examination and cross-examination shall be the same as though the deponent were testifying at the trial." 155 The uses at trial of the two
forms of deposition also are quite different. A discovery deposition
may be used for impeachment purposes in ways similar to that of
Rule 32(a) (1),156 while an evidentiary deposition may be introduced at trial as the testimony of an unavailable witness, physician
or surgeon.' 57 Therefore, evidentiary depositions most frequently
are conducted with a party's own witness, while discovery depositions most frequently involve witnesses favorable to the opposing
party.
By not preserving the distinction between discovery and evidentiary depositions, the Federal Rules may lead some to conclude
that all depositions should be conducted like evidentiary depositions, the equivalent of trial testimony. 58 The no-consultation rule
152. ILL. S. CT. R. 202 (providing that notice of deposition must specify purpose, either evidentiary or discovery, for which deposition is taken).
153. Id.
154. ILL. S. CT. R. 206(c)(1) (providing that deponent "may be examined
regarding any matter subject to discovery under these rules"). The Illinois
Supreme Court Rules define the scope of discovery in similar language to the Federal Rules, extending it to "any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action." ILL. S. CT. R. 201 (b) (1).
155. ILL. S. CT.R. 206(c) (2). Similar language in the Federal Rules has been
relied upon by supporters of no-consultation rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) ("Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the
trial under the provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence except Rules 103 and
615."). Nevertheless, the language is not the same. The Illinois Rule clearly states
that the evidentiary deposition "shall be the same as... testifying at the trial." ILL.
S. CT.R. 206(c)(2). Rule 30(c) instead refers to the basic evidentiary manner of
proposing questions. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(c). It does not provide that depositions
and trial testimony shall be the same.
156. ILL. S. CT. R. 212(a) (outlining "purposes for which discovery depositions maybe used"). For a discussion of the use under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure of depositions for impeachment purposes, see supra notes 140-46 and
accompanying text.
157. ILL. S. CT. R. 212(b) (outlining use of evidence depositions).
158. See, e.g., REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON DEPOSMON PRACrIcE, supra note 110,
at 22 (reasoning that "[s]ince deposition testimony is often admissible at trial, the
same rule [no communication between counsel and witness until conclusion of
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has a place in evidentiary depositions, but not in discovery depositions. 159 As noted by the language of Rule 32(a) (3), the evidentiary
use of depositions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arises
in "exceptional circumstances," 60 and more narrow circumstances
than the Illinois evidentiary deposition. 16 1 An analogue that only
occurs in "exceptional circumstances" should not be a sufficient basis for intruding upon the attorney-client relationship by prohibiting off-the-record conferences. This is certainly the case in light of
163
the legitimate, 162 if not mandated reasons for such conferences.
Perhaps the Federal Rules would be well served to reinstate the distinction between discovery and evidentiary depositions and establish different procedures for each similar to the approach taken by
Illinois. This distinction would clarify when a deposition is intended to serve a testimonial function. In such circumstances, having deposition procedure mimic trial testimony makes perfect
sense. Nevertheless, making discovery depositions follow trial procedure creates a contentious environment and is counter-productive to the primary function of discovery-fact finding.
VI.

CAN THEY Do THIS?

Whether the no-consultation rule is a good idea, or whether it
is based upon insufficient factual justification or erroneous premises is irrelevant if the rule is beyond the power of district courts to
enact. Several of the formulations are troublesome in this regard
because they cut sweeping paths through the constitutional guarantee of a right to representation, regulation of the profession, rules
testifying] should be applicable at depositions"); Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150
F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that attorney-client conferences during
deposition are not permitted, in part, because they are not permitted during witness' testimony at trial).
159. See In reAsbestos Litig., 492 A.2d 256, 257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding
no-consultation rule appropriate for depositions of plaintiffs who suffer from "lifeconsuming asbestos-related diseases" causing depositions to be evidentiary in
nature).
160. Id.
161. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 32(a)(3) (conditioning evidentiary use of depositions under Federal Rules upon unavailability of witness) with ILL. S. CT. R. 212(b)
(allowing for deposition of physicians and surgeons to be used as evidence depositions regardless of availability of witness).
162. For a discussion of the "good" reasons for deposition conferences, such
as correcting factual errors and providing support for the deponent in the face of a
belligerent questioner, see supra notes 58-86 and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of professional obligations requiring off-the-record attorney-client conferences when the client as deponent either purposefully or inadvertently provides inaccurate information during depositions, see supra notes 7586, 90-97 and accompanying text.
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of discovery and rules of evidence. This is neither a proper nor wise
exercise of the local rulemaking authority of the district courts. Additionally, consideration of the issue is fraught with confusion because of the various possible sources and scopes of authority for
district courts to enact local rules.
A.

Not If It's Inconsistent

The scheme of local rulemaking contemplates district courts
establishing procedures that "would be few in number and confined to purely housekeeping matters." 164 These rules, as established by statutory authority, are to be "consistent with Acts of
Congress and the rules of practice and procedure prescribed under
section 2072 of this title," 165 and pursuant to delegation from the
Supreme Court in Rule 83, are not to be "inconsistent" with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 166 Nevertheless, courts have enacted a great number of rules that cover a myriad of topics and that
frequently violate the mandate of avoiding inconsistency. 16 7 This
may be due in part to the concept of "inconsistency" remaining elu68
sive and ill-defined.'
The Supreme Court twice has examined local rules against the
standard of "inconsistency." The results unfortunately do not provide much guidance. A local rule providing for discovery depositions in admiralty actions was struck down as inconsistent with the
General Admiralty Rules, which at that time governed procedure in
admiralty actions and did not provide for discovery depositions.1 69
The local rule was deemed a "basic procedural innovation" better
left to the rulemaking powers of the Supreme Court. 170 Thirteen
years later, a local rule reducing the number of jurors from twelve
to six was held not to amount to a "basic procedural innovation"
164. WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 6, at 431.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994) (providing for rule-making power of federal
courts).
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (providing that "[e]ach district court by action of a
majority of the judges thereof may from time to time, after giving appropriate
public notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing
its practice provided that such rules are not.., in any manner inconsistent with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure").
167. See REPORT OF LocAL RuLEs PROJECT, supra note 15 (identifying local
rules throughout the country that are in conflict with provisions of Federal Rules).
168. See David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure:Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 537, 539-40 n.8 (1985) (discussing failure of Supreme Court to provide useful
definition of inconsistency).
169. Miner v. Atlas, 363 U.S. 641, 647 (1960).
170. Id. at 650.
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because the rule "plainly does not bear on the outcome of the litigation." 171 Taken together, the two cases do not provide much gui172
dance for evaluating inconsistency.
In its most common formulations, the no-consultation rule
touches on areas governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but is not directly inconsistent with the language of any provision. 173 Rule 30(c) provides, most notably, for the manner in
which examination of witnesses should proceed at deposition and
how objections should be made.' 7 4 The no-consultation rule arguably addresses the topic of examination of witnesses, but it is not
directly inconsistent with the language or intent of Rule 30(c).
Similarly, Rule 30(d) (3) provides a mechanism for obtaining relief
when a deposition is being conducted "in bad faith," addressing
conduct that the no-consultation rule seeks to preemptively control. 175 Here the no-consultation rule does not conflict with the
Federal Rule, rather it supplements it. There are other examples,
but a further explication seems unnecessary as the Federal Rules
governing discovery clearly contemplate supplementing local
rules 76 and specifically provide for alteration to the scheme of dis171. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163-64 n.23 (1973).
172. See Roberts, supra note 168, at 539 n.8 (noting that Miner and Colgrove
"provide no useful standards for distinguishing the changes that are basic from
those that are not"). Decisions of the lower courts invalidating and upholding
local rules support that assessment.
The nature of many local rules, involving minor matters that do not directly
affect the ultimate outcome of a case, is such that cause them seldom to be subject
of appellate review. See id. at 546-47. Therefore, the guidance from case law is
sparse and "inconsistent" and hence invalid rules remain "on the books." WRIGHT,
supra note 19, § 63, at 432.
173. SeeWhitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995).
In upholding the local rule requiring federal prosecutors to obtain judicial approval before serving subpoenas on attorneys, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit stated that the "proper method for determining whether a
local rule is inconsistent with a federal rule of procedure is to inquire, first
whether the two rules are textually inconsistent and, second, whether the local rule
subverts the overall purpose of the federal rule." Id. at 1363 (citation omitted).
174. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(c). For a further discussion of Rule 30(c), see supra
note 123 and accompanying text.
175. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(d) (3) (providing for order to be entered that ceases or
limits "the taking of a deposition in terms of scope and manner when it has been
shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or other unreasonable
manner").
176. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d) (2) (providing that local rules may impose
limits on "the time permitted for the conduct of a deposition"); see also FED. R. Civ.
P. 30(d) (Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment) (discussing amendments to paragraphs (2) and (3) that clarify power of district courts to enact local
rules that place limits on length of depositions and that provide for requests for
additional time to complete deposition).
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covery by local rule. 177 Additionally, none of the possible inconsistencies could be said to subvert the functioning of any rule that
would amount to a "basic procedural innovation" that would "bear
on the outcome of litigation." 178 Nevertheless, the most far-reaching formulations of the no-consultation rule are invalid because
of the attorthey contain direct inconsistencies with basic notions
179
ney-client privilege and the scope of discovery.
B.

Rewriting the Attorney-Client Privilege-Talk About Inconsistency!

Not all of the formulations of the no-consultation rule avoid
inconsistency. The two most far-reaching approaches, that of the
Northern District of Illinois and the Hall Rule, contain provisions
that limit the extent of the attorney-client privilege and extend the
scope of discovery.' 80 Each provision is born out of an extreme mistrust of the ability of attorneys to conduct themselves within the
boundaries of ethical behavior. Thus, each strips away the attorneyclient privilege or any other applicable privilege from off-the-record
conferences in order to determine whether improper witness8
coaching took place.' '
The Northern District of Illinois proposal contains the standard exception from the no-consultation rule for conferences held
to determine whether to assert a privilege.' 8 2 Being mistrustful of
whether any communication for this allowed purpose will be so lim177. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (1) (providing for exception by local rule
from mandatory disclosure); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (providing for local rule to alter
timing and sequence provisions of Rule 26(0); FED. IRCiv. P. 26(b) (2) (providing
that district courts by local rule may "alter the limits in these rules on the number
of depositions and interrogatories and may also limit the length of depositions
under Rule 30 and the number of requests under Rule 36"); see also FED. R Crv. P.
26(b) (Advisory Committee Notes on 1993 Amendment) (discussing one of purposes of amendment is to "dispel any doubt as to the power of the court [by local
rule] to impose limitations on the length of depositions under Rule 30 or on the
number of requests for admission under Rule 36").
178. For a discussion of what amounts to a "basic procedural innovation," see
text accompanying supra note 171.
179. For a discussion of the formulation of the no-consultation rule that alters
the attorney-client privilege, see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
180. See N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RuLE 5.23(C), supra note 23 (providing for disclosure of attorney-client consultations regardless of existing privilege);
Hall Rule, supranote 22, at 532, 6 (making attorney-client conferences "a proper
subject of inquiry by deposing counsel").
181. Cf DIST. OF COLORADO, RuLE 30.1C, supra note 22 (providing for inquiry
by opposing counsel into content of any off-the-record conference "to the extent it
is not privileged").
182. See N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RuLE 5.23(B), supra note 23 (providing that "counsel for the deponent may confer with the deponent off-the-record
only for the purpose of deciding whether to assert a privilege").
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ited, the proposal provides for inquiry of the deponent as to
whether any communication took place that violated the rule and
requires the deponent "to disclose the content of the communication regardless of whether such communication would otherwise
have been protected by the attorney-client or any other privilege." 183 The Hall Rule similarly provides that any attorney-client
conferences held during the deposition "are a proper subject of
inquiry by deposing counsel to ascertain whether there has been
any witness-coaching and, if so, what."' 84 Under the Hall Rule, the
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship is more far-reaching
because it prohibits conferences during recesses as well as during
185
the actual taking of testimony.
If challenged, these provisions should be held invalid because
they are inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the common law of privileges. The
scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure extends to "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter."' 8 6 Both no-consultation provisions provide for discovery
concerning attorney-client communications that otherwise would
be subject to a claim of privilege.' 8 7 Alternatively, the provisions
might be viewed as not expanding the scope of discovery but rather
183. See N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RuLE 5.23(C), supra note 23.
184. See Hall Rule, supra note 22, at 532 (making attorney-client conferences
"a proper subject of inquiry"). This characterization of attorney-client conferences
is somewhat ambiguous in terms of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
The opinion, however, removes any ambiguity as to whether the allowed inquiry
into attorney-client conferences is limited by applicable privilege. Hall v. Clifton
Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 529 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that "these conferences
are not covered by the attorney-client privilege").
185. Id. The proposal of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois exempts recesses from the scope of its no-consultation rule. See
N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RuLE 5.23(C), supra note 23. Presumably, the provided inquiry that pierces the attorney-client privilege would not extend to conferences during recesses for they would not violate the proposed rule.
186. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b) (2). For a further discussion of the scope of discovery and Rule 26(b) (1), see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89-90 (1976) (discussing
ways to deal with witness coaching other than prohibiting attorney-client conferences during overnight recesses, and stating that "[a] prosecutor may cross-examine a defendant as to the extent of any 'coaching' during a recess, subject, of
course, to the control of the court," and that record could be used in closing argument to challenge credibility of witness); Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
Comm'n, 160 F.RD. 51, 54 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding that deposition questions asking whether anyone had instructed deponent how to answer questions sought information protected by attorney-client privilege); In re Asbestos Litig., 492 A.2d
256, 258-59 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (discussing that "questions directed to the deponent subsequent to any attorney-client consultation during deposition testimony
must reflect a balance between the interest of preventing coaching and the interest
of the attorney-client privilege," and suggesting questions that accommodate bal-
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as redefining or creating an exception to the attorney-client privilege. So viewed, the provisions would be in conflict with the Federal Rules of Evidence, which leave the law of privileges to that
existing and to be developed by common law.188 These no-consultation provisions take the development of the attorney-client privilege from the common law and make it the subject of local
rulemaking. In actions in which state law supplies the rule of decision, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide for state privilege law to
control. 189 These privilege-altering formulations of the no-consultation rule would then either be inapplicable in diversity cases or be
in conflict with the Federal Rules of Evidence and, perhaps in conflict with, basic notions of federalism. 190 Even in the effort to reign
in Rambo, local rulemaking should not be cutting such a wide path
through the landscape of evidence and civil procedure.' 9 1
C.

Why Worry About Consistency ?-Local Rulemaking Pursuant to
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990

Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates local
rule consistency with existing rules of procedure and acts of Conance by inquiring whether coaching took place, but not inquiring as to what was
said between attorney and client).
188. FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Acts of Congress or in the rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in light of reason and experience.
Id.
189. Id. (providing that where "state law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with state law").
190. In enacting Rule 501 and deferring to state privilege law, Congress rejected a proposed version of the rule which required that federal privilege law
would control in all cases, including diversity actions. The proposal was rejected
by Congress in favor of deference to state privilege law in order to accommodate
principles of comity, the Erie doctrine and discourage forum shopping. See CHRIsTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.4, at 339-41 (1995).
191. It does not appear that either Judge Gawthrop in Hall v. Clifton Precision Systems, 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993), or the Northern District of Illinois
contemplated this consequence. No mention of it is made in the Hall opinion.
The Report of the Committee on Deposition Practice,however, does mention the issue as
a question to be considered but never actually engages in the contemplated consideration. REPORT OF COMMrTTEE ON DEPosrrION PRACTICE, supranote 110, at 21.
Perhaps this serves as fine example of the basis of much of the criticism of local
rulemaking as being adopted without the careful consideration that is attendant to
the Federal Rules. For a discussion of how the rule represents much of what critics
of local rulemaking have decried, see supra note 19.
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gress.192 Although the two privilege-altering versions of the no-consultation rule violate the mandate of consistency, neither
formulation claims Rule 83 as its source of authority. The proposal
of the Northern District of Illinois came about as a result of its Delay and Expense Reduction Plan developed pursuant to the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA). s Commentators have disagreed whether the CJRA authorizes the adoption of inconsistent
local rules that are not shackled with the mandate of consistency of
Rule 83.194 Therefore, the proposal's inconsistency with existing
law of privilege might not cause invalidation. 1 95 Nevertheless, the
district courts should not be rewriting the law of evidence in a hastily conceived effort to curb Rambo-esque tactics. The danger of allowing a district court to rewrite the law of evidence is wellillustrated in the Northern District of Illinois.196 After acknowledging that its rule could take several forms, the Report of the Committee
on Deposition Practicestates that a consensus was arrived at that "some
rule should be enacted" and a citation is given that "in most matters
192. For a discussion of Rule 83, see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994) [hereinafter CJRA] (requiring each district court
to implement "a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan"). In formulating a
plan a district court "shall consider and may include ... litigation management
and cost and delay reduction [techniques]" that address certain enumerated areas
including "such other features as the district court considers appropriate." 28
U.S.C. § 473(a), (b) (6) (1994).
The plan of the Northern District of Illinois set out to develop guidelines for

depositions as a litigation management technique. See

UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, CJRA DELAY & EXPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 17 (Nov. 15, 1993) (authorizing Chief Judge "to form a committee of

attorneys... to develop a set of guidelines for use by attorneys in the conduct of
depositions").
194. See, e.g., Lauren Robel, FracturedProcedure: The CivilJustice Reform Act of
1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1447 (1994) (arguing that CJRA neither compels nor authorizes local rules that are inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other
statutory law); see also Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375 (1992) (arguing that CJRA authorizes wholesale rulemaking that may alter existing rules of procedure or statutory law); Linda S. Mullenix,
UnconstitutionalRulemaking: The CivilJustice Reform Act and the Separation of Powers,
77 MINN. L. REv. 1283, 1289-95 (1992) (arguing wholesale rulemaking authorized
by CJRA violates basic notions of separation of powers); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice
Reform and the Balkanization of FederalCivil Procedure,24 ARIz. ST. LJ. 1393 (1992)
(analyzing CJRA as exacerbation of recent trends toward balkanization of procedure by means of non-uniform and inconsistent local rules).
195. But see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 94-CIV-580,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6481 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 1995) (holding that local rulemaking pursuant to CJRA may extend beyond the boundaries of consistency of Rule
83, but nevertheless refusing to enforce offer of judgment provision because it
would frustrate purpose of Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
196. See WIG-r, supra note 19, § 63A, at 435-39 (criticizing local rulemaking
under CJRA as allowing "amateur and ill-equipped advisory groups" to pose a
"[great] threat" to the integrity of the Federal Rules).
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it is more important that the applicable law be settled than that it
be settled right."1 97 The law of evidence and the basic nature of the
attorney-client privilege should not be altered out of a desire to do
something, though the drafters are not entirely sure what.
D.

Local Rulemaking as a Control of Pre-TrialProcedure-The Suspect
Rule of Hall v. Clifton.

The adoption of local rules pursuant to Rule 83 or the CJRA
has been much criticized as threatening the integrity of the Federal
Rules, in part because local rulemaking does not include the careful deliberation that is involved in the adoption of the Federal
Rules. 198 Nevertheless, each involves some form of consideration
by a deliberative body as well as an opportunity for notice and public comment. 199 The Hall Rule poses an even greater threat. It is
the most far-reaching of the no-consultation rules. 20 0 By extending
the prohibition into all recesses it most likely violates constitutional
guarantees of a right to representation. 201 It also creates conflicts
with existing law by removing the attorney-client privilege from
communications during recesses.2 02 Nevertheless, it is simply a pretrial order entered by one judge in one case addressing issues not
raised by either party that has transformed itself into controlling
20 3
case law that trumps local rulemaking.
197. REPORT OF COMMrirEE ON DEPOSITION PRACTICE, supra note 110, at 26
(citing Burnet v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)).
198. See Wiuorrr, supra note 19, § 62, at 431-32 (criticizing local rulemaking,
in part, for "casual manner" in which they are adopted).
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 472 (1994) (providing for advisory group from each district to submit report containing, in part, assessment of needed reforms to be included in district's expense and delay reduction plan and providing for
opportunity for public notice of report); 28 U.S.C. § 474 (1994) (providing for
review of each plan by committee comprised of chief judge of district court and
chief judge of circuit court); FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (requiring action by majority of
judges of district to enact local rules and providing for public notice and comment
prior to rule or rules taking effect).
200. For a discussion of the reach of the Hall Rule as compared to other noconsultation rules, see supra notes 40 and 180 and accompanying text.
201. For a discussion of no-consultation rules as violating the constitutional
right to representation, see infra notes 217-37 and accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of how removing the attorney-client privilege from recess discussion during depositions creates conflict with existing law, see supranotes
184-85 and accompanying text.
203. See REPORT OF CommITTrEE ON DEPOSITION PRACrICE, supra note 110, at 27
n.20 (discussing that if recent decision in Northern District of Illinois by Judge
Castillo in Chapsky v. Baxter, No. 93-C6524, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9099 (N.D. Ill.
July 5, 1994), which cited Hall, had intended to adopt it as controlling case law,
then 'no-consultation rule being proposed by Committee would be inconsistent
with controlling case law and could not be adopted by Northern District).
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Judge Gawthrop entered the order that was to become the Hall
Rule after being contacted by counsel about opposing counsel seeking to confer with his client on two occasions during the deposition.2 0 4 Apparently, neither party had filed a motion seeking relief
from abusive or evasive discovery tactics. 20 5 The court held a conference with counsel 206 and entered a pretrial order governing the
conduct of depositions in the instant action.2 0 7 The court stated
that the grant of power over pre-trial case management in the Federal Rules was sufficient authority to enter its far sweeping no-consultation order.2 08 What is troublesome is that the order amounts
to a form of back door rulemaking.2 09 It addresses matters not
raised by the parties and that were not before the court. The troublesome recess and the attorney-client privilege issues were not even
presented by the facts of the case.2 10 The order would have been
an appropriate limitation of "the scope and manner" of taking a
deposition in response to bad faith conduct that was actually occurring. 21 1 Nevertheless, Judge Gawthrop turned the case into an opportunity to implement controls on deposition conduct broadly as a
2 12
matter of controlling case law.
204. Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
205. Id. at 527 n.1.
206. Id. at 526.
207. See id. at 531 (referring to order as "guidelines for conduct of depositions
of parties and other witnesses represented by counsel in this case").
208. See id. at 527 ("Taken together, Rules 26(0, 30, and 37(a), along with
Rule 16, which gives the court control over pre-trial case management, vest the
court with broad authority and discretion to control discovery, including the conduct of depositions. It is pursuant to that authority and discretion that I enter this
Opinion and Order.").
209. See FED R. Civ. P. 83. Rule 83 does provide for individual judges to "regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the
district in which they act." Id. Nevertheless, the Hall Rule was not adopted as a
standing order or a "practice." For discussion of the problems caused by practices
adopted by individual judges, see MyronJ. Bromberg &Jonathan M. Korn, IndividualJudges'Practices:An InadvertentSubversion of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 68
ST. JoHN's L. Ruv. 1 (1994).
210. See Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 526. The parties contacted the court about a question concerning the right to consult after two interruptions in the deposition occurred. Id. The question of consultation during recesses or the applicability of the
attorney-client privilege were not raised by the situation. Id.
211. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d) (3); see also 4AJAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE
30.16, at 30-145 (1994) (discussing in context of regulation of
deposition conduct pursuant to Rule 30(d) "that the courts will generally refuse to
prohibit or limit the scope of an examination before it has commenced, but will
require the objecting party to defer his objection until the examination' is under
way, at which time the validity of the objections can usually be better
determined").
212. In fact, Hall has been followed by a number of courts. See Chapsky v.
Mueller, No. 93-C6524, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9099, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 1994)
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This sort of back door rulemaking is antithetical to recent
changes to statutes and rules intended to improve the local
rulemaking process by providing for notice and comment on proposed rules as well as establishing advisory committees to study and
make recommendations about local rules.2

13

The Hall Rule repre-

sents one judge's opinion of how depositions should be conducted
and seeks to have that view followed as established case law.2 14 The

danger of such "rulemaking" by judicial fiat is apparent from the
problems with the Hall Rule concerning right to representation and
2 15
privilege, reflecting that the order simply was poorly reasoned.
(citing Hall for proposition that deponent and attorney cannot hold private conference unless purpose is to decide whether to assert privilege); Johnson v. Wayne
Manor Apts., 152 F.R.D. 56, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same); Christy v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Comm'n, 160 F.R.D. 51, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting Hall does not support argument not allowing counsel to properly prepare witness for deposition but
apparently citing Hall for proposition that attorney should not confer with client
during deposition); Van Pilsum v. Iowa State Univ. of Science & Technology, 152
F.R.D. 179, 180 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (citing Hall for proposition that lawyers should
not interrupt questions at depositions in attempt to reformulate witnesses' testimony). The Committee on Deposition Practice of the Northern District of Illinois
cited Hall as the "key argument in favor of prohibiting deponent-attorney communications." REPORT OF COMMrrEE ON DEPOSMON PRACrICE, supra note 110, at 21.

213. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (1994) (providing for "appropriate public notice
and an opportunity for comment" as part of rulemaking procedure); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2077(b) (1994) (providing for each district court to appoint an advisory council
to study local rules); FED. P. Crv. P. 83 (providing for "appropriate public notice
and an opportunity to comment" as part of rulemaking procedure).
214. See Hal 150 F.R.D. at 526. Eighteen months after entering the pre-trial
order in Hall Judge Gawthrop referred to the order as a "holding" that would be
followed if it were not for a retro-activity problem, making the order sound as if it
were a rule or statute. Langer v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., No. 91-CIV-1814, .1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2199, at 28 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 1995).
215. The court referred to "orders from numerous courts holding such conversations are not allowed." Hall 150 F.RLD. at 527 n.2. The orders cited, however, address different situations than that presented in Hall and do not extend as
far as the Hall rule. See, e.g., In re Branniff, Inc., Nos. 89-03325-BKC-6C1, 92-911,
1992 WL 261641, at *14 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 1992) (entering order establishing deposition guidelines including prohibition on conferences "during the actual
taking of the deposition" but not extending that prohibition into recesses as did
Halo; In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. 90-CIV-2485, 1990 WL
358009, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 21, 1990) (entering order prohibiting conferences
"during the actual taking of the deposition" but allowing conferences "during recesses or adjournments"); In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., No. MDL
721, 1989 WL 168401, at *38 (D.P.R. Dec. 2, 1988) (entering order establishing
deposition guidelines including prohibition on conferences "during the conduct
of the deposition" but not extending that prohibition into recesses as did Hal).
Indeed, Judge Gawthrop conceded in Hall that the issue was one about which
"there is not a lot of caselaw." Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 525. Nevertheless, 18 months
later he referred to his opinion in Hall as based upon caselaw that was "well-established." Langer, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2199, at *28 n.4. For a discussion of the
court's misreading of the status of current case law concerning the extent to which
courts may prohibit attorney-client contact during recesses, see infra note 224 and
accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, it has become controlling case law that has been cited
with approval and, ironically, has been considered to invalidate
properly proposed local rules that do not seek to reach as far.2 1 6
VII.

CAN

THEY REALLY (CONSTITUTIONALLY)

Do

THIS?

The question of whether a witness has a constitutional right to
confer with counsel while giving testimony has led a checkered
existence. In the context of attorney-client conferences during the
testimony of a criminal defendant, the Court has drawn "a line of
constitutional dimension" between conferences occurring during
fifteen minute recesses and those occurring during overnight
breaks.2 1 7 The Sixth Amendment apparently guarantees only the
right to engage in overnight consultation,2 1 8 but not during brief
recesses.2 1 9 The basis for the distinction is that a witness has no
constitutional right to consult with counsel about present testimony, but during overnight recesses the consultation between attorney and client could extend to matters beyond the content of
the witness's testimony. 22 0 Nevertheless, the Court took great pain
to explain it was not basing the distinction on "an assumption that
trial counsel will engage in unethical 'coaching.' ",221
The applicability of the right to confer during depositions in
civil actions is unclear. Though courts have extended the right to
confer to civil litigants during trial recesses,22 2 an extension to dep216. For a discussion of how a decision adopting Hallwas considered to invalidate a proposed local rule to the extent there was an inconsistency, see supra note
203 and accompanying text.
217. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280-85 (1989) (holding that Sixth
Amendment does not require allowing criminal defendant to confer with counsel
during 15-minute recess occurring during his testimony).
218. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (holding trial judge's
order that criminal defendant may not confer with his attorney during overnight
recess to be violative of Sixth Amendment).
219. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 284-85 (holding "Federal Constitution does not
compel every trial judge to allow the defendant to consult with his lawyer while his
testimony is in progress if the judge decides that there is a good reason to interrupt the trial for a few minutes").
220. Id. at 281, 284.
221. Id. at 281. But see id. at 292 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that

holding of majority is "motivated, at least in part, by underlying suspicion that
defense attorneys will fail to 'respect the difference between assistance and improper influence' " (citation omitted)).
222. See Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118 (5th Cir.)
(holding that civil litigants have Fifth Amendment right to consult with counsel
that is same as criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right as defined in Geders),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); see also Cartin v. Continental Homes, 360 A.2d 96,
98 (Vt. 1976) (holding "in line with the concurring opinion in Geders, that there is
at least abuse of discretion, if not constitutional infirmity, in any order barring
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ositions has not been well received. 223 Those decisions are troublesome for two reasons. First, they contain little reasoning or citation
to authority.2 24 Second, they primarily rely on the premise that attorneys will engage in unethical witness coaching if given the opportunity. 22 5 This rationale for a no-conference rule was explicitly
22 6
rejected by the Court in the criminal law context.
Assuming the right to confer as established in civil trials in
Geders v. United States22 7 and Perry v. Leeke22 8 is applicable to deposi-

tions, there is no constitutional infirmity with those formulations of
the no-consultation rule that prohibit conferences while a question
is pending.2 29 The right to confer does not provide for interruption of testimony to confer with counsel. 23 0 Similarly, those formucommunication between a party and his attorney"); cf. Opinion No. 200 of the
Mississippi Bar (June 12, 1992) (finding it "ethically permissible for an attorney to
speak to his client in a civil lawsuit concerning the client's testimony during a court
recess as long as the attorney does not counsel or assist the client to testify falsely").
But see Stocker Hinge Mfg. Co. v. Darnel Indus., Inc., 377 N.E.2d 1125, 1133 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978) (refusing to apply Geders to civil actions because "the right of a party
to counsel in a civil case is quite divergent from the right of defendant in a criminal prosecution").
223. See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.RD. 525, 528-29 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(holding deponent's "right to counsel and to due process" does extend past the
point that witness "has taken the stand"); In re Asbestos Litig., 492 A.2d 256 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that order prohibiting attorney-client consultations during deposition does not violate right to counsel); see also REPORT OF COMMITrEE ON
DEPOsmON PRAcncE, supra note 110, at 27 n.28 (stating that proposed no consultation rule "poses no constitutional problems").
224. The Hall holding is without cited authority and seems to be based on the
false belief that the right to consult with counsel during recess in criminal actions
had not been extended to testimony in a civil action and ignoring the holding in
Potashnick. Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1101. The Committee on Deposition Practice of
the Northern District of Illinois noted that its proposed no-consultation rule
"could raise constitutional questions," cited applicable authority, both pro and
con, but concluded without any explanation other than a reference to the conflicting caselaw that there were "no constitutional problems". See REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON DEPOSrrION PRACrICE, supra note 110, at 25 n.25, 27 n.28.
225. See Hall 150 F.R.D. at 528-29 (justifying imposition of no-consultation
rule in order to prevent purposeful witness coaching); Asbestos Litig., 492 A.2d at
259 (holding that order prohibiting attorney-client consultations during deposition is necessary to prevent witness coaching); see also N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RuLE 5.23(B), supra note 23 (stating purpose of proposed rule is "to prevent
counsel for deponent from improperly suggesting answers or the content of testimony to a witness").
226. For a discussion of the Court's rejection for this rationale, see text accompanying supra note 220.
227. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
228. 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
229. For a discussion of the various forms of the no-consultation rules that
apply to pending questions, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. It is the
interruption of testimony that provides the greatest opportunity for improper witness-coaching.
230. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284 (1989) ("[W]e do not believe the
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lations that apply to short recesses 23 ' would also pass constitutional
scrutiny. 23 2 Only the formulations that prohibit conferences occurring during overnight recesses, 23 3 where matters other than the deponent's testimony are discussed, would infringe upon the client's
right to counsel. 234 Nevertheless, although various formulations of
the no-consultation rule are constitutionally permissible, that does
not mean the rule must or should always be imposed. 23 5 The
Court, in Perry v. Leeke clearly contemplated that consultations
could be allowed during brief recesses in some situations.2 s6 In
light of the various "good" reasons for attorney-client conferences
23 7
during deposition, such conferences should be permitted.
VIII.

A SAD SURRENDER

In many respects, the no-consultation rule "throws in the
towel" on finding the best mechanism for regulating attorney conduct. Regulation of the profession through codes of conduct apparently was deemed ineffectual to control abusive attorney
conduct during discovery.23 8 Thereafter, a scheme of judicial mandefendant has a constitutional right to discuss that testimony while it is in process."); see also id. at 287 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (stating that idea that there is no
constitutional right to interrupt witness's testimony to confer with counsel is
"truism").
231. For a discussion of no-consultation rules that prohibit conferences during short recesses, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
232. See Perny, 488 U.S. at 284 (noting "in a short recess in which it is appropriate to presume that nothing but the testimony will be discussed, the testifying defendant does not have a constitutional right to advice").
233. For a discussion of no-consultation rules that would prohibit attorneyclient conferences during overnight recesses, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
234. For a discussion that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to attorney-client consultation during overnight recesses, see supra note 218 and accompanying text.
235. See Pery, 488 U.S. at 284.
Our conclusion does not mean that trial judges must forbid consultation
between a defendant and his counsel during... brief recesses. As a matter of discretion in individual cases, or of practice for individual trial
judges, or indeed, as a matter of law in some States, it may well be appropriate to permit such consultation.
Id.
236. Id.
237. For a discussion of the "good," benign, helpful and professionally mandated reasons for attorney-client conference during deposition, see supranotes 5886 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidotefor an Opponent's Pretrial
Discovery Misconduct: Treatingthe Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the
Weakness of the Opponent's Case, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 795. Imwinkelried notes
that:
Partly in response to the perceived failure of the bar disciplinary system,
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agement and control as well as sanctions for improper conduct was
developed to address improper attorney conduct during discovery.23 9 Despite these strengthened mechanisms, concerns with the
conduct of lawyers persisted. 240 In what could be viewed as coming
full circle, the last decade has witnessed a proliferation of "civility
codes" aimed at the state of professionalism in general and address2 41
ing discovery abuses specifically.
The no-consultation rule represents the next step. It is clearly
unethical behavior to coach one's witness as to what to say. 2 42 It is

also an act of "bad faith" that is sanctionable under the rules of
discovery.243 Yet, instead of drawing a line between permissible and
impermissible conduct, the no-consultation rule fires a preemptive
strike against the opportunity for abusive conduct before it can occur. 244 It is a sad, simple surrender to the belief that attorneys will
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 16, and 26 were amended in 1983.
The thrust of the amendments was to toughen the enforcement of discovery obligations. In particular, the amendments were intended to encourage judges to punish discovery misconduct by imposing sanctions
more aggressively.
Id.
239. See FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d) (3) (providing for party confronted with abuses
during depositions to seek relief in form of limitations on "scope and manner of
the taking of the deposition" as well as seeking monetary sanctions).
240. See Imwinkelried, supra note 238, at 795 ("It was hoped that the sanctions
movement' would discourage obstructionism. Although the movement was promising, it now appears doubtful that sanctions alone will provide an adequate solution to the problem of discovery misconduct.").
241. It is interesting that at the same time that the no-consultation rule and its
preemptive approach to controlling attorney conduct has become embraced by
district courts, "codes" of "professional conduct" have been adopted by courts as
well. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITHIN THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (1994) (setting forth enumerated duties owed by lawyers
and courts in order to ensure conduct evincing "personal courtesy and professional conduct"). Perhaps the profession has not entirely given up on the ability of
attorneys to conform their conduct to ethical norms, obviating the need for the
preemptive approach to the control of attorney conduct of the no consultation
rule. See also Brent E. Dickson & Julia Bunton Jackson, Renewing Lawyer Civility, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 531, 538 n.49 (1994) (noting that in last decade civility codes have
been enacted in 24 different states); Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalismas Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 657, 684 (1994) (discussing
civility codes and noting that "lawyer regulation may be evolving backwards");
Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) "Much Ado About Nothing?", 46 HASTINGS LJ. 679, 785 (1995) (discussing civility
codes as redundant mechanism to control discovery abuse).
242. For a discussion of ethical restraints on witness coaching, see supra note
88 and accompanying text.
243. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 30(d) (3) (providing that, on motion of party at any
time during deposition that examination is being conducted in bad faith, the court
may limit scope and manner of taking of deposition and provides for award of
expenses in relation to motion).
244. SeePerryv. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284 n.8 (1989) (discussing as alternative
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engage in unethical conduct if given the opportunity.2 45 This mistrust is fueled by the fact that "off-the-record" conferences indeed
are "off-the-record." Though there are desirable, permissible and
even professionally mandated reasons to engage in attorney-client
conferences, the no-consultation rule exists because its proponents
do not trust that what takes place when no one is watching is within
the bounds of allowable professional conduct. This point is driven
home by the deliberations in the Northern District of Illinois where
the problem of potential inability to enforce a no-consultation rule
astonishingly focused on not being able to be sure of what an attor24
ney and client will discuss while in the bathroom.
There must be a better way. Must the profession worry about
not being able to enforce or control what attorneys will say to their
clients while in the bathroom? The Northern District of Illinois answered the question with a resounding YES! The no-consultation
rule was embraced, while the attorney-client privilege was stripped
away from bathroom conversations during depositions in order that
opposing counsel may check up on whether the subject matter of
the conversation was proper. 247 It is a dangerous, downward path
for the profession to take. If mistrust of attorney conduct and adherence to ethical norms is to be the rationale for rules of practice,
the adversary system will have to be scrapped.2 48 Almost every asto prohibition on attorney-client conferences that "the judge may permit consultation between counsel and defendant during such a recess, but forbid discussion of
ongoing testimony").
245. For a discussion of the premise underlying the no-consultation rule that
conferences are used by attorneys to subvert the discovery process, see supra notes
98-99 and accompanying text.
246. See REPORT OF COMMITrEE ON DEPOSITION PRACTICE, supra note 110, at

24-25. The Report stated:
Enforceability is another consideration. One purpose of rules is to let
honest, conscientious lawyers know what is permissible and what is impermissible conduct in the promotion of their clients' interests. A related
purpose is to control the conduct of less scrupulous lawyers, but that purpose is served only if the rule is enforceable. Rules governing the conduct of attorneys and witnesses in the presence of opposing counsel and
while proceedings are being transcribed or otherwise recorded can be
enforced because opposing counsel know of, and there is a record of, any
questionable conduct. That is not true of rules that purport to govern
conduct of a deponent and the deponent's lawyer at a bathroom or overnight recess in a deposition.
Id.
247. See N. DIST. OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED RULE 5.23(B), (C), supra note 23 (providing for inquiry into attorney-client conferences during recesses regardless of
applicable privilege).
248. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 93 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring) (agreeing that criminal defendant has Sixth Amendment right to consult
with counsel during overnight break in testimony, and, in expressing unwillingness
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pect of litigation presents an opportunity for the unethical attorney
to engage in unethical conduct. Must the attorney be turned into a
potted plant throughout the process of litigation, or the attorneyprivilege be removed, in order to provide for inquiry into the possibility of inappropriate behavior? Must the client be denied the
assistance of the counsel the client has retained? Is the next step to
prevent all contact throughout the litigation between attorney and
client because we cannot trust that unethical behavior will not take
place?

249

There are better ways to deal with attorneys who engage in improper conduct during depositions. Professional punishment is
warranted for those attorneys who engage in improper conduct in
the more extreme forms.2 50 In other situations, the mechanisms
available in the Federal Rules should be vigorously pursued.2 5 1
Rule 30(d) (3) provides for judicial intervention during a deposition to address improper conduct by limiting the "scope and manner" of the deposition and by awarding expenses.2 5 2 In appropriate
to base any decision on belief that attorneys will act unethically stating, "[i] f our
adversary system is to function according to design, we must assume that an attorney will observe his responsibilities to the legal system, as well as to his client"); see
also id. at 89-90 (holding that criminal defendant has Sixth Amendment right to
consult with counsel during overnight break in testimony, and discussing that alternatives exist to deal with improper witness-coaching that are preferable to ban
on attorney-client contact that is based upon belief that attorneys will act unethically); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1976) ("All but very few
lawyers take seriously their obligations as officers of the court and their proper role
in the administration ofjustice. We think the probability of improper counseling,
i.e., to lie or evade or distort the truth, is negligible in most cases."), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 908 (1977). But see Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversay Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295 (1978) (arguing that
adversary nature of discovery contributes to many of its ills and proposing according reforms).
249. Preventing pre-deposition contact between attorney and client may not
be that far off. Parties have in fact sought such relief, albeit unsuccessfully. See
Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n,' 160 F.R.D. 51, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (declining to issue protective order prohibiting counsel from "instructing witnesses
prior to depositions").
250. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (discussing authority of federal
courts to discipline attorneys).
251. See Panel Discussion: The Rambo Litigator, The Tenth Annual JudicialConference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 216, 227
(Apr. 30, 1992) (expressing "amazement" that "lawyers don't use the tools that are
available [Rules 16, 26, 37 and 56] when confronted with abusive discovery tactics)
(comments of Professor Michael E. Tigar)).
252. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d) (3); see also CHiAuis ALAN Wirorr & RICHARD MARcUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2113, at 95-100 (1994) (discussing evolution of Rule 30(d) as mechanism of control of deposition conduct).
For an example of the effective use of available mechanisms to control abusive
behavior at a deposition, see Van Pilsum v. Iowa State Univ. of Science & Technology, 152 F.R.D. 179, 180-81 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (imposing order to deal with "Rambo
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situations, one of the limitations could include a no-consultation
order.2 53 But the order should be applied only after a specific attorney has shown the predilection to engage in improper witnesscoaching.2 5 4 Application across the board unduly interferes with
practitioners who seek to use conferences for reasons that are professionally mandated and assist the discovery process. Of course, it
could be argued that the sanctions approach is an inefficient mechanism that encourages satellite litigation. Nevertheless, the no-consultation rule does not alleviate that problem. It simply makes
conferences presumptively improper, leaving enforcement to the
existing sanction mechanisms.2 55 As long as there is an exception
for discussion of whether to assert a privilege, a matter of contention remaining that is ripe for further satellite litigation.

IX. Do WHAT

YOU

MUST, BUT STAY OUT OF THE BATHROOM!

The bottom line attorney behavior that the no-consultation
rule seeks to prevent is coaching the deponent as to what his or her
testimony should be. Or, as stated by Judge Gawthrop in Hall v.
C4fton Precision, "[t]he witness comes to the deposition to testify,
not to indulge in a parody of Charlie McCarthy, with lawyers coaching or bending the witness's words to mold a legally convenient answer."2 5 6 A broad prohibition against all attorney-client
conferences might accomplish that purpose. Yet a problem remains. The no-consultation rule allows attorneys and clients to consult in order to decide whether to assert a privilege.2 57 Therefore,
an exception was created for conferences for this perceived permissible purpose. Once any consultation is permitted, then the specter
of mistrust raises its head as to whether the consultation was actually for the permissible purpose. The answer-remove the privilege
from consultations in order to allow a peak into the bathroom to
Litigation" tactics at deposition that included offender paying for 50% of his oppo
nent's deposition costs, and use of discovery master, at expense of offender, to
oversee further depositions ordered to take place in United States Courthouse).
253. FED. R Civ. P. 30(d)(3).
254. Id.

255. SeeJohnson v. Wayne Manor Apts., 152 F.R.D. 56, 58-59 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(citing Hall with approval and providing enforcement by means of provisions of
Rules 26, 30 and 37).
256. Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
257. One could argue that conferring for purposes of determining whether to
assert a privilege is also unnecessary and that the privilege could be asserted without consultation. It would seem the result would be antithetical to the discovery
process that fear of inadvertent waiver of the privilege would cause it to be raised

in the face of any possibility of its existence. Conferences lead to a more judicious
use of the privilege.
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determine whether anything that was said between attorney and client was impermissible because no record is made of that conversation (fortunately). This downward spiral loses track of the bottom
line, and of the desirable, permissible and even mandated reasons
258
for off-the-record attorney-client consultation.
For the most part, the bottom line can be accomplished with
minimal intrusion into the attorney-client relationship. If district
courts feel compelled to attempt to regulate this aspect of attorney
conduct, the best approach is that of the districts that simply prohibit conferences while a question is pending.2 59 This accomplishes the goal of preventing direct suggestion of answers. At the
same time, attorney-client conferences for the "good" reasons are
not inadvertently prohibited, and the unwarranted rewriting of the
attorney-client privilege is avoided.
Of course, any allowed consultation, even one for an intended
"helpful" purpose, could be prone to misuse. Instead of ensuring
accuracy and merely engaging in "hand-holding," the attorney
could subvert the fact-finding process by suggesting answers. Even
the inadvertent suggestion of an answer might occur during the attorney's inquiry into deponent mistake or misunderstanding.
Therefore, this consultation would have no place prior to the deponent having answered a pending question. Nevertheless, after the
inaccurate answer has been given, the consultation can have the
useful purpose of correcting errors without filtering or suggesting
the answer.2 60 With the consultation occurring only after an answer
has been given and when there is no question pending, the impeachment value of the inaccurate answer is not lost for the proponent. If there is a significant change in the deponent's response
after the consultation, the prior response would most likely be inconsistent with later testimony at trial and provide a source for im258. For a discussion of the problems inherent in removing the attorney-client privilege from deposition discussions, see supra notes 58-86, 90-97 and accompanying text.

259. For examples of rules of courts which prohibit discussion only while a
question is pending, see supra note 38.
260. Practitioners employing consultation for proper purposes would not ini-

tiate the consultation until after the answer has been given. Such consultation is
limited to a discussion of whether mistake or misunderstanding has occurred. If
that is discovered, the deposition recommences on-the-record with the consulting
attorney making a statement to the effect: "After consultation with my client we
believe the answer given to the previous question was inaccurate as my client misunderstood the question. If you will re-ask the question, my client can you give you

a more accurate answer." This represents the custom observed by other practitioners and during my ten years of civil practice, primarily in the Northern District of
Illinois.
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peachment as a prior inconsistent statement.26 1
The questioning attorney is'not left without recourse if the use
of off-the-record conferences appears to be improper or becomes
obstructionist. The fact that conferences have been held can be
noted for the record putting a taint on the post-conference answer
that can be used to attack the credibility of the witness.2 62 Additionally, the deponent may be asked after the conclusion of the conference whether the conference concerned prior testimony. 263 The
trier of fact would then be left with the impression that the witness
is less than credible as the witness's version of what happened is
subject to change at the suggestion of counsel. It is problematic as
to how significantly the proponents of the no-consultation rule believe that attorneys consulting with clients for the improper purpose of suggesting answers are able to affect their client's testimony
without setting the client up for later impeachment. If a witness is
in fact coached during a "no-question-pending conference" that results in a change in that witness's testimony, the record will reflect
the change. The pre-conference answer can be compared to the
post-conference answer for purposes of impeachment. The fact
that a consultation occurred can itself be noted for the record and
used to attack the credibility of the witness at trial. These controls
are sufficient if fully utilized.
One could argue that the "no-question-pending conference"
still allows for witness coaching, just not directed at a specific answer to pending question, and if done artfully, the price of impeachment does not have to be paid. But, an attorney with a bent
toward such behavior would most likely coach his or her client
before the deposition begins as to the answers to specific ques261. See FED. R. Evin. 613(a) (providing for impeachment of witness by prior
inconsistent statement); see also Chapsky v. Baxter, No. 93-C6524, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9099, at *5 (N.D. Ill.July 6, 1994) (discussing in response to motion seeking

to bar use of deposition testimony changed after attorney-client consultation that
"the better approach would be to use plaintiff's prior inconsistent deposition testimony to impeach her at trial").
262. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 190, § 6.34 (stating that proof of
bias of witness "may properly show ...that the witness has been 'coached' by trial
counsel"); see also Kolczynski, supra note 75, at 25, 29 (discussing that "[t]he best
way to discourage coaching is to put it on the record... [t] he weight given to postconference testimony may be diminished if the court or jury believes the witness
was not providing his own independent and unaided recollection of the facts").
263. See Kolczyniski, supra note 75, at 29 (discussing ways "to turn the tables
[i]f conferences occur repeatedly"); id. ("After any conference or recess, ask
the witness whether he had a conference with his lawyer or consultant concerning
the prior testimony. The lawyer may assert the attorney-client privilege, but this
question is proper because it is directed whether they conferred about prior testimony, not what was said.").
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tions.2 64 Even the most restrictive no-consultation rule does not
seek to control such conduct.265 When there is not a question
pending, any improper coaching during the consultation is nothing
more than a reminder of the previous improper coaching that took
place.
These forms of behavior aimed at disrupting the free flow of
information during discovery simply cannot be controlled by local
rule. 2 66 That can only be achieved if local rule chases the attorney
and client from the deposition to whatever location they may have
previously conversed and strip away even more of the attorney-client privilege. The downward spiral based on mistrust of attorneys
must stop somewhere. The "no-question-pending conference" is a
good place to stop.
X.

CONCLUSION

The no-consultation rule is an ill thought out over-reaction to
the problem of discovery abuse during depositions. It represents
that which critics of local rulemaking have much decried. Having
been adopted without any reliable empirical support for its utility, it
overlooks that there are reasons other than witness-coaching for
consulting with a client during deposition. Consultations also take
place for purposes that are consistent with the goal of 'just, speedy,
and inexpensive" discovery, and are, perhaps, mandated by an attorney's professional obligations. Additionally, in its most far-reaching formulations, the no-consultation rule presents significant
difficulties. Most notably, the attorney-client privilege is improperly
redefined by local rule, and the right of a client to representation is
intruded upon. Thus, the rule has taken forms that are unconstitutional, inconsistent with rules of procedure and evidence, and beyond the authority of the district courts to enact.
Most significantly, the no-consultation rule represents a low
264. Additionally, attorneys routinely admonish their clients prior to being
deposed as to the form the deponent's answers should take. The goal is to encourage the client to volunteer as little information as possible by giving the shortest possible answer and never volunteering information. See Brazil, supranote 248,

at 1330-31 (discussing instructions given by "aggressive litigators" to their clients in
order to "limit and distort the flow of information" during depositions).
265. See Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 160 F.R.D. 51 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (citing HaUwith approval but declining to issue protective order prohibiting
counsel from "instructing witnesses prior to depositions").

266. See Brazil, supra note 248, at 1348-61 (discussing proposals to change
adversary nature of discovery in order to address discovery abuses that are largely
based on increased professional obligations on attorneys and clients rather than
on mechanisms such as no-consultation rule).
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point in efforts to control discovery abuse. Adequate mechanisms
exist for the control of discovery abuse and to professionally punish
those attorneys who persist in improper conduct. Nevertheless, the
no-consultation rule takes a very different approach. Based on an
assumption that all attorneys will act unethically if given the opportunity, the rule seeks to preempt improper attorney conduct by restricting the interaction of attorneys and clients in order to remove
the opportunity for prohibited conduct. It is an unnecessary overreaction that turns Rambo, as well as the most civil of litigators, into
potted plants.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss4/2

54

Taylor: Rambo as Potted Plant: Local Rulemaking's Preemptive Strike again

1995]

RAMBO As POTTED PLANT
APPENDIX
ADOPTED

1111

A

LocAL RuLEs

Local Rule 30.1C for the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, entitled Sanctions for Abusive Deposition
Conduct, provides:
A. The following abusive deposition conduct is
prohibited:
1. Objections or statements which have the effect of
coaching the witness, instructing the witness concerning
the way in which he or she should frame a response, or
suggesting an answer to the witness.
2. Interrupting examination for an off-the-record conference between counsel and the witness, except for the purpose of determining whether to assert a privilege. Any offthe-record conference during a recess may be a subject for
inquiry by opposing counsel, to the extent it is not
privileged.
Local Rule 30.1 for the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, entitled Conduct of Depositions,
provides:
An attorney for a deponent shall not initiate a private conference with the deponent regarding a pending question
except for the purpose of determining whether a claim of
privilege should be asserted.
Local Rule 13 for the United States District Court for the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, entitled Conferences
Between Deponent and Defending Attorney, provides:
An attorney for a deponent shall not initiate a private conference with the deponent during the actual taking of a
deposition, except for the purpose of determining
whether a privilege should be asserted.
Local Rule 204(b) for the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina, entitled Differentiated Case
Management and Discovery, states:
Depositions shall be conducted in accordance with the following guidelines: . . . Counsel and their witness-clients

shall not engage in private, off-the-record conferences
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while the deposition is proceeding in session, except for
the purpose of deciding whether to assert a privilege.
Local Rule 230-5 for the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon, entitled Depositions, provides:
(a) Conduct of Counsel at Depositions. Counsel shall not
engage in any conduct during a deposition that would not
be allowed in the presence of a judge.
(d) Pending Questions. If a question is pending, it shall
be answered before a recess is taken, unless the question
involves a matter of privacy right, privilege or an area protected by the constitution, statute or work product.
Local Rule 30 for the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, entitled Depositions Upon Oral Examination,
provides:
(e) Conferences Between Non-Party Deponent and Defending Attorney. An attorney defending at a deposition
of a non-party deponent shall not engage in a private conference with the deponent during the actual taking of a
deposition, except for the purpose of determining
whether a privilege should be asserted.
The Hall Rule as adopted by Judge Gawthrop in Hall v. Clifton
Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993), stated:
5. Counsel and their witness-clients shall not engage in
private, off-the-record conferences during depositions or
during breaks or recesses, except for the purpose of deciding whether to assert a privilege.
6. Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of, guideline (5) are a proper subject for inquiry by
deposing counsel to ascertain whether there has been any
witness-coaching and, if so, what.
7. Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of, guideline (5) shall be noted on the record by the
counsel who participated in the conference. The purpose
and outcome of the conference shall also be noted on the
record.
Id. at 531-32.
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APPENDIX B
PROPOSED LOCAL RULES

Proposed Rule 5.23 for the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, entitled Deponent-Attorney Communications, provides:
A. Examining Counsel May Instruct Deponent to Seek
Clarification, etc., from Examining Counsel
At any time during a deposition, examining counsel
may instruct the deponent to ask examining counsel,
rather than the deponent's own counsel, for clarification,
definitions of any words, questions, or documents
presented during the course of the deposition.
B. Limitations on Communications with Deponent
In order to prevent counsel for a deponent from improperly suggesting answers or the content of testimony to
a witness and to prevent the disruption of the deposition,
during examination by any party or counsel other than
the party offering the deponent as a witness, no party or
counsel, including the deponent's counsel, shall communicate with the deponent (other than through on-the-record interrogation) regarding the interrogation, the
testimony or the facts of the case. During interrogation by
other counsel, counsel for the deponent may confer with
the deponent off-the-record only for the purpose of deciding whether to assert a privilege, and as permitted by section D of this Rule. This prohibition applies, without
limitation, to all means of communication and is applicable, without limitation, to all periods of examination of
the witness by anyone other than counsel for the party offering the deponent as witness. The prohibition, however,
does not apply during ordinary and necessary recesses
taken during the deposition session, such as lunch breaks
and rest periods. Counsel for a deponent and the deponent shall not initiate breaks or recesses for the purpose of
engaging in communications to circumvent the prohibitions of this Rule.
C. Determination of Communications Violating Section
B
To determine whether any communication has taken
place in violation of section B of this Rule, examining
counsel may ask a deponent whether the deponent has
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communicated with any person regarding the interrogation, the testimony or the facts of the case in violation of
this Rule. Examining counsel may bring any such violation to the Court's attention during the course of the deposition or thereafter, and the Court may instruct the
witness to disclose the content of any prohibited communication regardless of whether such communication would
otherwise have been protected by the attorney-client or
any other privilege.
D. Communication Permitted Between Deponent &
Counsel Following Interrogation by All Other Counsel
After a deponent has been interrogated by all counsel
except for counsel offering the deponent as a witness, the
deponent may communicate with counsel prior to being
asked any further questions. The substance of any such
communication will be protected by any privilege that
would be applicable in the absence of this Rule.
Proposed Rule 6 for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, entitled Conferences Between Deponent and Defending Attorney provides:
Attorney-client conferences should be kept to a minimum.
The defending attorney should not initiate a conference
during the pendency of a question except to determine
whether a privilege should be asserted. Attorney-initiated
conferences for any other purpose during the pendency
of a question are presumptively improper and continued
conferences are sanctionable.
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